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This thesis focuses on one of the most important currency unions in the world known as the CFA 
zone. The goal of this thesis is to draw a comparison of African countries with their own national 
currencies to African countries that are part of the CFA zone and examine how this affects their 
macroeconomic performance in terms of GDP growth, inflation or trade. The thesis has 3 
chapters. The reader should view each chapter as stand-alone papers. 
Chapter 1 develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two 
recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu 
(2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by 
prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980-2009 
data from 12 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the 
new index is used to 1) show how CBI affects countries that are part of a monetary union and 2) 
examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa.   
The results suggest that CBI works differently for countries that are currency union members. 
Unlike countries with monetary independence, where premature removals of central bank 
governors lead to higher inflation rates. We see the opposite trend for countries that are part of a 
currency union; this study suggests that premature removals of central bank governors instead 
lead to lower rates of inflation. This is due to the fact that one of the gains of currency union 
memberships is discipline in monetary policy where the central banker’s role is to implement 
monetary policy that ensures the stability of the zone rather than one’s country. So, in cases 
where the central banker attempts to privilege one country, other member countries can force 





Chapter 2 examines the benefits of CFA zone membership by estimating the effects of joining 
the CFA zone on short run business cycles indicators such as income per capita and inflation as 
well as long-term economic indicators such as trade relations with France and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Mali. Using the synthetic control method (SCM), we show that Mali’s CFA 
membership has a positive effect on its income, inflation, and foreign direct investment (FDI) but 
no discernible effect on trade relations with France. We conclude that joining the CFA zone can 
generate potential economic gains for countries seeking membership by fostering growth and 
providing price stability but does not necessarily increase trade relations with France even 
though the CFA is a former French colonial currency. 
Using data from 1980 to 2009 for 23 African countries (9 CFA countries and 14 non-CFA 
countries), Chapter 3 examines the effect of commodity price shocks on the likelihood of a 
central bank governor removal. Governor removals are decomposed into premature removals and 
ally replacements. Our conditional fixed effects logit models show that commodity price shocks 
have no effect on the probability of a central bank governor’s premature removal but lead to a 
statistically significant increase in the likelihood of an ally replacement and this is true for both 
non-CFA and CFA countries. This trend holds when commodities price shocks are separated into 
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CHAPTER 1:  The Inflationary Cost of Central Bank Independence in Africa: 
Monetary Servitude or Monetary Freedom? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Central bank independence (CBI) has traditionally been defined as the ability of a central bank to 
conduct monetary policy without political interference. Independence implies that a central bank 
can choose the goals of monetary policy, the tools necessary to achieve those goals or both. 
Today, CBI is often seen as an important signal of a central bank’s credibility in its conduct of 
monetary policy (Arnone et al. (2009). Most studies of CBI have however looked at how 
independence affects the monetary authority’s behavior for individual countries. However, it is 
not always clear how CBI operates in different contexts; specifically in the case, where countries 
belong to a monetary union.  
This paper revisits the relationship between CBI and inflation but extends the analysis to an 
African currency union known as the CFA zone1. The focus of the paper is to compare how CBI 
works for African countries with their own currency to how it works for African countries that 
belong to this union, using newly constructed measures of CBI. Africa is of particular interest 
first, because governments there have a long history of monetizing their debts and engineering 
inflation surprises through expansionary monetary policy. High inflation has constantly plagued 
African economies, which tend to rely too heavily on monetization to offset fiscal deficits 
(Aghevli and Khan (1978)). Increased central bank independence may help reduce the 
temptation to repeatedly impose an inflation tax, and thus, dampen the adverse effects of high 
inflation. 
                                                          
1 CFA stands for African Financial Community. The CFA zone is a monetary union consisting of 
2 zones  and the Comoros. The currency for the union is known as the CFA Franc and is pegged 
to the euro at a fixed rate. A further description of the zone will be provided later in the paper. 





Secondly, traditional measures of de facto CBI often fail to account for the socio-political 
climate in African countries where the fiscal authority is sometimes inseparable from the 
monetary authority. This implicitly suggests a certain level of alliance between the head of the 
executive branch and the central banker, which old measures of CBI thus far have failed to 
incorporate but our new measures do. These novel measures rely first, on the de facto CBI, a 
measure first introduced by Cukierman et al. (1992) and second, on the alternative measures 
introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011).  
De facto CBI, a measure that is proxied by the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) 
shows that above a certain threshold (a TOR of 0.20 or 0.25) a frequent turnover of central bank 
governors indicates a lower level of independence.2 Using this measure of CBI, studies have 
shown that higher turnover rates are associated with higher inflation rates (Ex., Cukierman et al. 
(1992) and De Haan et Kooi, (2000)). 
The new measures of CBI, introduced in this paper, examine whether the turnover of a central 
bank governor occurs before the end of the first term (premature variable) and whether the 
replacement of a central bank governor is an ally (ally variable). In Vuletin and Zhu (2011), a 
central bank’s governor is considered an ally if he or she was the highest official in any ministry 
or top government agency that pertains to the economy or a similar field during the previous year 
before his or her nomination as central bank governor. Our paper, however, modifies this 
definition of the ally measure by relaxing the one-year restriction. We argue that because of the 
dictatorial nature of some African countries, a newly-appointed governor can be considered an 
ally as long as he or she occupied an executive position under the same president, regardless of 
the time period. Our paper also classifies a person as an ally if 1) he or she occupies a high 
                                                          
2 The threshold is calculated by assuming the average electoral cycle is around four or five years. 





position in the ruling party of the government in power or 2) if he or she is a member of the same 
tribe as the president3. 
Few papers have conducted CBI studies concentrated solely on Africa. Presnak (2005) analyzes 
the relationship between the Cukierman index and inflation in 11 African countries over the 
period 1960-1989. The paper finds that de facto CBI explains little to no variation in the inflation 
rates for these 11 countries. Kasseeah et al. (2011) uses two proxies for CBI: TOR and the 
relative size of the government budget deficit, on 20 African countries over the period 1988-
2007. Their results indicate that de facto CBI is positively related to inflation and explains 
around 30% of the variation in the inflation rate. Agoba et al. (2017), using 48 African countries, 
find that in the presence of high banking sector development and institutional quality, legal CBI 
lowers inflation. 
This paper contributes to the literature in four ways: One, our paper is the first to examine the 
relationship between CBI and inflation in a monetary union context. Second, new CBI measures 
are created that take into account the close alliance between the fiscal authority and the monetary 
authority in African countries. An important distortion that often leads to issues of commitment 
in monetary policy for African central banks. Third, our analysis allows us to compare the 
relationship between CBI and inflation between countries that are part of a monetary union to 
countries that are not. Finally, including an analysis of central banking in Africa, specifically the 
CFA zone, brings light to the fact that some African countries belong to a monetary union, a 
dimension that previous papers have often failed to account for in their analysis. 
Using the criterion discussed above, we construct a CBI index for 30 African countries (12 CFA 
zone countries and 18 non-CFA countries) over the period 1980-2009. We then investigate the 
                                                          
3 We classify a change in central bank governor as ally under any of the dimensions cited above, 





relationship between CBI and inflation for the whole sample and then repeat the analysis for two 
sub-samples: CFA countries and non-CFA countries. Our findings can be summarized as follow: 
i. Central bank governors in non-CFA countries are 2.4 times more likely to be prematurely 
removed than governors in CFA countries (39.8% versus 16.7%). 
ii. A higher turnover rate of central bank governors (as measured by our four-year rolling 
average) leads to an increase in inflation in both the full sample and the non-CFA 
countries. 
iii. Our ally and premature measures are statistically significant determinants of inflation for 
the CFA countries. In CFA countries, the premature removal of a central bank governor 
who is perceived as a challenger leads to a decrease in inflation, particularly when that 
governor is replaced by an ally. 
iv. There is an inverse relationship between de facto CBI and inflation when countries 
belong to a monetary union due to monetary discipline required to sustain the credibility 
of the union. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the CFA zone. Section 3 elaborates on the 
old and new measures of CBI. Section 4 discusses our variables and methodology. Section 5 
presents our results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
1.2  Background of the CFA zone  
At to the end of WWII, several colonial powers formed monetary arrangements (e.g., CFA 
zones) whose sole purpose was to strengthen the ties between the colonies and the metropole. 





for today’s African monetary institutions. The CFA4 Franc was introduced in 1945 and was 
pegged to the French Franc at a rate of 1 CFA franc for 1.7 French Francs.5 Today, however, the 
CFA  zone is a monetary union consists of two zones, each with its own regulating agency: they 
are the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) which includes the 
countries of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Congo 
and uses a currency denoted XAF issued by their region’s central bank (BEAC) and The West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) which encompasses Benin, Burkina-Faso, 
Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo and uses a currency denoted XOF 
issued by their region’s central bank (BCEAO).6 
The most noteworthy feature of this monetary union is the operations account system.7 The role 
of the operations account is to guarantee unlimited access of the two central banks to the French 
Franc prior to 1999 and to the Euro thereafter, via the Bank of France. For most countries with 
fixed exchanges rates, the national central banks are required to maintain the announced fixed 
rate. This is done by ensuring that the central bank maintains a sufficient reserve of foreign 
currencies.  
For CFA zone countries, in contrast, the parity of the CFA with the Euro is maintained by the 
French Treasury which essentially eliminates the potential problem of having too few foreign 
reserves. In exchange, the CFA zone countries are required to deposit all their external assets and 
earnings in their operations account at the French Treasury. 50% for the Central African 
countries and 60% for the West African countries, of their earnings. Other notable features of the 
                                                          
4 CFA in French means Colonies Francaises d ‘Afrique or French colonies of Africa. 
5 Masson and Pattillo (2005, p. 15). 
6 BEAC stands for Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale and BCEAO stands for Banque Centrale des Etats de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest in French. 
7 It is important to note that both BEAC and BCEAO maintain separate operations account with 





CFA zone include: 1) The board of directors for each central bank must include French 
representatives (i.e., 2 for the BEAC, 3 for BCEAO, and 4 for the Central bank of Comoros); 2) 
The CFA currencies are legal tenders only in their respective zones; 3) Free capital mobility8 
exists between the two zones and France; and 4) The CFA is pegged to the euro at a fixed rate of 
1 euro=655,957 CFA Franc. 
Central banks in the CFA zone have a dual mandate which consists of maintaining low and 
stable inflation and sufficient foreign reserves. Moreover, because the CFA zone is a monetary 
union with a fixed peg, one might wonder if there room for monetary policy in the zone. In fact, 
there is scope for monetary policy in the union because of the limited de facto capital mobility 
that has persisted. Short-intervention is often needed in the CFA zone countries because of 
fluctuations in the U.S. Dollar-Euro exchange rate or in output or terms of trade that are due to 
commodity price shocks. The main monetary policy instruments used in the zone are reserve 
requirements (BEAC) and open-market operations (BCEAO). 
Another important question to raise concerns the source of inflation in the CFA zone. Inflation in 
the region is a result of both money creation and inflation in the Eurozone. Money creation 
comes from direct central banking financing through statutory advances and the spending of 
commodity-based revenues. Although central bank charters limit credit advances to 20% for 
each member country. De facto, credit advances are much higher. For instance, between 1994 




                                                          






1.3 Old and new measures of de facto CBI 
The level of central bank independence conferred by law often differs from the level of 
independence in practice (i.e., the de facto CBI). The measure of the average turnover rate of 
central bank governors9 is known as the Cukierman index. Table 2 shows the average TOR for 
each country, as well as its frequency of central bank governor replacements. Mauritania has the 
highest TOR, where a governor is replaced on average every two years (TOR = 0.5). The lowest 
TOR, 0.067, is in the Central African CFA countries, where a central bank governor is replaced 
on average every 15 years. A low turnover rate does not necessarily mean that a country has a 
higher level of CBI, but instead, could indicate a central bank governor remained in office for a 
long time by simply accommodating the fiscal needs of the executive branch.  
Cukierman et al. (1992) conducted their analysis of the relationship between CBI and inflation 
by calculating the average turnover rate for each decade. The drawback with using decade 
averages to calculate the turnover rate is that it is sensitive to periods of high volatility (outliers), 
which could be due to institutional changes such as amendments to a central bank charter that 
can increase or decrease the degree of CBI or some political turmoil. To avoid this problem, our 
analysis follows De Haan and Klomp (2010) and calculates instead a four-year rolling average of 
the turnover rate.10 The use of a four-year rolling average, instead of a decade average, can also 
mitigate the potential for reverse causality between inflation and central bank independence. That 
is, our four-year rolling average reduces the potential endogeneity of the turnover rate by helping 
to separate the effect of a high turnover rate of central bank governors on inflation from the 
effect of high inflation on the term of central bank governors (Dreher et al. (2008)). 
                                                          
9 The frequency of central bank governor replacements is simply the inverse of a country’s TOR. 
10 We choose a four-year rolling average to be consistent with the average time of an election 






Vuletin and Zhu (2011) argue that TOR depends on whether the central bank governor is 
removed prematurely (i.e., before the end of his or her first term) and whether the central bank 
governor’s replacement is an ally or a challenger. A premature removal suggests the firing of a 
Table 2: Average TOR over 1980-2009 and frequency of central bank governors 
Country/Monetary 
Zone 
   Average 
TOR 
 Average frequency of CB governor replacement 
 
    
BCEAO 0.133 7 years and 6 months 
 
BEAC 0.067 15 years 
 
Botswana 0.167 6 years 
 
DRC 0.233 4 years and 3 months 
 
Egypt 0.200 5 years 
 
Ghana 0.133 7 years and 6 months 
 
Kenya 0.200 5 years  
 
Madagascar 0.167 6 years 
 
Malawi 0.267 3 years and 9 months 
 
Mauritania 0.500 2 years  
 
Mauritius 0.167 6 years 
 
Mozambique 0.133 7 years and 6 months 
 
Nigeria 0.167 6 years 
 
Rwanda 0.167 6 years  
 
Sierra Leone 0.267 3 years and 9 months 
 
South Africa 0.133 7 years and 6 months 
 
Sudan 0.267 3 years and 9 months 
 
Tanzania 0.133 7 years and 6 months 
 
Tunisia 0.233 4 years and 3 months 
 




disobedient central bank governor, who is unwilling to abide by the government’s economic 
agenda. As mentioned above, this paper relies on a definition of alliance that is consistent with 
African politics. That is, a central bank governor is considered an ally if he or she occupies a 
high position pertaining to the economy in the country’s executive branch or in the country’s 





Ivory Coast is an example of such alliance between the nominating president and the central 
banker. There, the ruling party and the tribe of the president have influenced the choice of a 
central bank governor. For instance, when Philippe Henri Dacoury-Tabley became head of the 
BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States), his candidacy was heavily supported by then 
Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo of the party, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI). One of the 
founders of FPI was Louis Andre Dacoury-Tabley, who is the brother of Governor Tabley, and 
like President Gbagbo, both brothers are from the Bete11 tribe. After President Gbagbo was 
ousted, the new president Alassane Ouattara, who was from a different tribe and political party, 
was given authority over the BCEAO transactions and activities by WAEMU, the regulatory 
body of the BCEAO. A few weeks later, the new government alleged that Governor Tabley 
refused to cooperate with them because of his allegiance to the former Gbagbo government. 
Shortly thereafter, Governor Tabley resigned under pressure by all eight presidents of WAEMU 
member countries. 
Our data set consists of 30 countries for the period 1980-2009, 12 are CFA countries and 18 are 
non-CFA countries.12 The first step in constructing the premature and ally variables is to 
calculate the annual number of central bank governor changes for each country. In the case of the 
CFA countries, the number of central bank governor changes is calculated as the number of 
changes for each monetary zone, i.e. two countries from the same monetary zone will have the 
same number of governor changes. Each governor change13 is then classified as either premature 
or non-premature. Like Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we contend that premature removals of central 
                                                          
11 See Mirrors of Justice, Law and Power in the Post-cold War Era by Kamari Maxine Clarke 
and Mark Goodale (72). 
12 Benin is dropped because of missing data for the outcome variable and some of the control 
variables. We also exclude Guinea-Bissau because this country joined the zone in 1997. 





bank governors are often removals of governors who are perceived to be challengers to the 
government. For every governor change, the new governor is classified as an ally or a non-ally.14 
Thus, each governor change falls into one of the following four categories: 1) premature and 
ally; 2) premature and non-ally; 3) non-premature and ally; or 4) non-premature and non-ally. 
A new central bank governor is considered an ally if he or she either 1) has previously occupied 
the highest position in a ministry or any top government agency as it pertains to the economy or 
2) comes from the same tribal background 3) comes from the same political party as the 
nominating president. To identify the premature and ally variables, we primarily use two 
datasets: Rulers of the world and the CIA dataset on the Chiefs of state and cabinet members of 
foreign government. We match the databases to the names of the central bank governors in our 
sample. Other sources then are used to complete any missing variables.15 
We found 127 changes (6 changes for the CFA central banks and 121 changes for the non-CFA 
central banks) in central bank governors from 1980 to 200916 for an average annual turnover rate 
of 0.152. That rate implies a central bank governor is replaced on average every 6 years and 5 
months. Each central bank governor change is then classified as either premature or non-
premature and as either ally or non-ally. Table 1 shows 16.7% of changes in CFA countries are 
premature compared to 39.8% in non-CFA-countries. One reason why CFA countries have a 
smaller number of premature changes is because the presidents of all member countries must 
agree to remove the central bank governor. Out of the 127 changes documented, we count 16 
                                                          
14 TOR= TOR_ally + TOR_non-ally. 
15 A complete list of the ministries and agencies used is available upon request. 
16 The 127 changes refer to all of the countries in our data. For the CFA zone countries, we do 






instances where the premature exit of a central bank governor was followed by an ally 
replacement; one instance in the CFA zone and 15 instances in the non-CFA countries.  
It is important to note that in the CFA countries, Ivory Coast and Gabon have been particularly 
influential in nominating the central bank governor. Specifically, four of the last six BCEAO 
governors were from the Ivory Coast, while three of the last five BEAC governors were from 
Gabon.17 This indicates that the de facto nomination of a central bank governor in the CFA zones 
is done by Ivory Coast and Gabon, where both countries likely push for candidates who will 
benefit their domestic interests.18 
The data also shows that if the central bank replacement is indeed an ally in both the CFA and 
non-CFA sub-samples, then an ally is almost always a top official of the executive branch or 
from the same tribe as the nominating president. There is only one instance over the entire time 
period when the ally who is selected as a central bank governor is also a high-ranking member of 
the ruling party.  
Using a sample of 42 countries (21 developed countries and 21 developing countries) that 
includes only one African country, (i.e., South Africa),Vuletin and Zhu (2011) finds that a 
central bank governor was replaced with an ally 8.5% of the time in developing countries, 0% in 
developed countries, and 5.4% in the full sample. In contrast, our African sample reveals that a 
central bank governor is replaced with an ally 33.3% of the time in CFA countries, 16.5% in 
non-CFA countries, and 17.5% in the full sample. The large number of ally changes in Africa 
                                                          
17 Both countries are the most important economies in their respective zones. 
18 It is important to note that the bank charters of the BEAC and the BCEAO zones state that 
legally all heads of state nominate the central bank governor, but in practice, Ivory Coast and 






can be explained, in part, by the higher level of political instability that Africa experiences, due 
to the continent’s frequent civil or ethnic wars and large number of dictatorships. 
Historically, political instability has had a severe impact on the quality of the institutions in many 
African countries. In the political economy literature, low-quality institutions, such as the lack of 
respect for property rights, have long been identified as a key reason why Africa’s economic 
performance has been so poor compared to other regions (see Knack and Keefer (1995) or 
Acemoglu et al. (2001)). Thus, we contend that Africa’s lower level of institutional quality is one 
reason why the percentage of ally changes is much higher in African countries than in the rest of 
the world. 
Table 1: Frequency of central bank governor changes by category  
  NON-PREM PREM  Total 
CFA countries       
NON-ALLY 66.7% 0 66.7% 
ALLY 16.6% 16.7% 33.3% 
Total 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
  
   
NON-CFA countries  
  
NON-ALLY 56.3% 27.20% 83.5% 
ALLY 3.9% 12.6% 16.5% 
Total 60.2% 39.8% 100% 
  
   
All countries 
   
NON-ALLY 55.06% 27.45% 82.5% 
ALLY 6.44% 11.05% 17.5% 








1.4 The empirical model 
a. The determinants of inflation in Africa: 
Understanding the underlying inflationary process, for non-CFA and CFA zone countries is a 
key component of our analysis. It also provides a clear understanding of the differences between 
autonomy and membership in a currency union. Inflation rates in poorer countries, in this case 
Africa have been higher than rates in more developed countries. Studies have shown that the 
main culprits of higher inflation in the region lie in both non-monetary and monetary 
determinants of inflation.  
On the non-monetary side, one of the main factors that negatively impacts inflation in non-CFA 
countries are fiscal deficits. Ozurumba (2012) finds that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation in Nigeria. Other factors include cost push 
factors such as rising oil prices or agricultural commodities shocks have also exacerbated 
inflationary pressures. Countries like Angola or Egypt have also suffered from high inflation 
rates due to currency devaluations that have led to higher volatility in their exchange rates. Sowa 
(1994), on the other hand, find that growth in the money supply is the main determinant of the 
changes in the price level in Ghana. 
Moreover, figures A1 and A2 in the appendix show that the inflation rates for the CFA zone 
countries have been much lower than their non-CFA counterparts. For CFA countries, inflation 
is also the result of non-monetary and monetary factors.  In the case of WAEMU countries, 
foreign prices pass through have a significant effect on the price level. This, because, 60% of the 
trading volume in the region come from manufactured goods imported from Europe. Exchange 





effect of possible fluctuations in the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the euro, given 
the peg between their currency and the euro.  
On the monetary side, although the French treasury limits credits extensions to the CFA zone 
countries to 20% of a counrty’s public revenue in the previous year. This criteria has not always 
been respected in the past. For instance, between 1994 and 1998, credit advances to Ivory Coast 
fluctuated between 32.7% and 49.3%. Thus, monetization of fiscal deficits is still a possible 
determinant of inflation for CFA zone countries. In addition to that, CFA zone countries are 
mainly commodity exporters countries19, consequently, foreign inflows also constitute another 
driver of inflation via the spending of commodity-related revenues. 
Finally, recent studies have also investigated the relationship between political instability and 
inflation volatility. Barugahara (2015) finds that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship betweem instability and inflation for 49 African countries. 
b. Model specification: 
We divide our analysis into three parts: The first part regresses inflation on the four-year rolling-
average TOR, this to examine whether the previous findings of a positive relationship between 
the TOR and inflation is robust to African economies. The second part tests the impact of our 
newly-constructed measures of TOR, premature vs non-premature and ally versus non-ally. 
Finally, the third part analyzes the impact of the interactions of our new CBI measures on 
inflation. 
Our model is captured by the following equation: 
                              𝜋𝑖𝑡=𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑐𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝐶
𝑐=1 , 
                                                          






where 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is inflation in country i, 𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the TOR in country i, 𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 represents the control 
variables: trade openness, the measures of political instability, government spending, world 
inflation, and income per capita for country i in period t, 𝛼𝑖 is the country fixed effects, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is 
the random effect. A researcher can use three techniques when analyzing panel data: 1) pooled 
OLS, where the data is grouped together and a simple regression is run; 2) country-specific fixed 
effects, which controls for non-observable differences across countries such as cultural or 
historical differences and the degree of a country’s aversion to inflation; or 3) random effects, 
where the variation across countries is assumed to be random and not correlated with the control 
variables in the model. In a panel data setting, fixed effects or random effects models are most 
commonly used. Researchers often perform the Hausman test to select the appropriate model. 
Our Hausman test results indicate that the fixed effects model is more suitable than the random 
effects model. Consequently, the results presented below are produced using a fixed effects 
specification. 
Our panel data set is comprised of 30 years of annual observations from 30 countries. The same 
unobserved characteristics in each country’s error term are present each year, which might lead 
to autocorrelation of the error term within a country’s cluster of observations. To address this 
issue, we relax the assumption of homoscedasticity and adjust the standards errors for the 30 
countries.20 
Our analysis relies on the inflationary process mentioned above and includes six other plausible 
determinants21 of inflation: trade openness, two measures of political instability: civil war and 
coup d’état, world inflation22, government spending, and income per capita.  
                                                          
20 To relax the assumption of no correlation over time for the same country, we assume 
cov(𝑒𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑖𝑘)= 𝛾𝑗𝑘 . 






a. The traditional measure of the TOR variable 
Our initial analysis regresses inflation on the four-year rolling-average turnover rate. The results 
of that regression, shown in Table 3 below, reveal a positive relationship between the turnover 
rate of central bank governors and inflation. That result mirrors the evidence in previous research 
and holds both for the full sample and the non-CFA countries. For CFA countries, the turnover 
rate is not related to inflation rates, the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
b. The determinants of inflation 
Table 4 presents a similar analysis to Table 3, except the “tranquil times” determinants of 
inflation are included in the fixed effects regression to allow for the possibility that our findings 
are driven by omitted variable bias. Our results show a positive relationship between inflation 
and the turnover rate continues to hold for the full sample and the non-CFA countries, but not for 
the CFA countries.23Specifically, columns 1-3 show the impact of the world inflation rate which  
is defined as the inflation rate in G7 countries (Jacome and Vasquez (2005)). We find that across 
all samples, an increase in the world inflation rate leads to a statistically significant increase in 
the inflation rate for all of our samples. Columns 4-6 control for trade openness, which is 
measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. Romer (1993) finds that, on average, 
inflation tends to be low for countries with a higher level of trade openness. This inverse 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 While it might make more sense to use Eurozone inflation for the CFA countries, given that 
the CFA is pegged to the Euro. For consistency across our samples, we use instead inflation in 
the G7 countries. 
23 We follow Vuletin and Zhu (2011) and examine the effect of tranquil times and stressful times 
determinants of inflation. Although the results are not reported, the effects of inflation target and 
exchange rate regime were tested for the full sample and the non-CFA countries, but not CFA 
countries since the data for the CFA countries has no variation. Similar to Vuletin and Zhu 
(2011), we find that inflation decreases with an explicit inflation target but increases when the 





relationship is statistically significant for the full sample and the non-CFA countries, but has no 
effect on inflation in the CFA countries. 
Table 3: TOR (four-year TOR) regressions without control 
variables 
  







    
Four-year TOR 5.998** 9.528*** -0.825  
(3.298) (4.720) (2.894) 
Number of observations 780 468 312 
𝑹𝟐 0.016 0.012 0.001 
Notes: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. The dependent variable is the inflation rate. The within 𝑹𝟐 is reported. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered. 
 
Columns 7-9 examine the effect of government spending on inflation. Theoretically, an increase 
in government spending is expected to push up inflation since countries with higher expenditures 
relative to revenues are more likely to use the inflation tax to raise revenue. Dupor and Li (2015), 
however, find empirical evidence that an increase in government spending leads to a fall in the 
inflation rate. Our results, like Dupor and Li (2015), show that government spending reduces 
inflation in both the full sample and the non-CFA countries. 
Columns 10-12 consider the effects of income per capita. Countries with higher income per 
capita often have a more efficient tax system and a more sophisticated financial system. Thus, 
high-income countries are more likely to employ policies that reduce the costs of inflation, which 





indicate that this relationship is negative and statistically significant for both the full sample and 
the non-CFA countries but positive and statistically significant for the CFA countries.24  
Columns 13-15 include all variables in the regression. The coefficients on government spending 
and trade openness become statistically significant for the CFA countries, while the coefficients 
on income per capita remain the same for all three samples. The sign on the turnover rate does 
not change, but the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant for the non-CFA countries and 
statistically significant for the CFA countries.  
In summary, our analysis shows that a higher turnover rate of central bank governors increases 
the level of inflation for the full sample and the non-CFA countries, but it does not affect 
inflation in the CFA countries. 
                                                          
24 We speculate that the direct relationship between income per capita and inflation, could be due 
to the fact that many of the CFA countries are oil exporters. Higher inflation could simply be the 





Table 4: TOR (4 year RA) regressions with  control variables  
      



















          
Four-year TOR 
4.007* 5.713** -0.716 3.878*** 11.082** -0.417 1.133* 10.130** -0.741 
 
(1.935) (2.937) (0.529) (2.003) (3.003) (0.546) (2.008) (3.118) (0.537) 
world inflation 2.850*** 3.62*** 0.290*** 
      
 
(0.274) (0.442) (0.067) 
      
Trade Openness 
   
-0.043* -0.056*** 0.039 
   
    
(0.014) (0.037) (0.002) 
   
Government Spending 
      
0.405** 0.135 0.010 
       
(0.095) (0.161) (0.022) 
Log (Income) 
         
          
Number of observations 780 468 312 774 462 312 765 455 310 
R
2 0.01 0.21 0.042 0.022 0.19 0.007 0.037 0.051 0.06 
         
    
Table 4 (cont.): TOR (4 year RA) regressions with  control variables     
 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Countries all countries non-cfa 
countries 
cfa countries all 
countries 
non-cfa countries cfa countries 
       
Four-year TOR 
5.140*** 4.449 -0.522 4.930** 7.069 -0.203** 
 
(1.976) (2.816) (0.502) (1.877) (2.631) (0.459) 
world inflation 
   
2.732*** 3.695*** 0.305*** 
    
(0.277) (0.420) (0.061) 
Trade Openness 
   
-0.055* -0.049*** 0.064** 
    
(0.013) (0.033) (0.002) 
Government Spending 
   
0.405*** 0.533* 0.154* 
    
(0.091) (0.137) (0.022) 
Log (Income) -5.760*** -23.12*** 1.10*** -5.730*** -21.675*** 1.31*** 
 
(0.973) (2.259) (0.163) (0.975) (2.503) (0.169) 
Number of observations 776 464 312 765 455 310 
R
2 0.051 0.21 0.145 0.143 0.36 0.300 









Next, we consider “stressful times” determinants of inflation in the analysis. Vuletin and Zhu 
(2011) study the effects of banking crises and default episodes25as a stressful time determinant of 
inflation. This paper uses a political instability indicator as a proxy for times of stress. Although 
banking crises and default episodes are plausible measures of economic stress in developed 
countries, we believe political instability is a better proxy for stress given the geo-political 
climate of Africa. Our two measures of political stability are civil war and coup d’état. 
Countries that are politically unstable have a tendency to use the inflation tax to increase 
revenues, and as a result, have a more difficult time following a time-consistent monetary policy. 
Thus, we expect a direct relationship between inflation and political instability. Using GMM and 
fixed effects estimation, Aisen and Veiga (2006) analyze the relationship between political 
instability and inflation for 100 countries over the period 1960-1999 and show that, on average, a 
higher level of political instability leads to higher inflation. 
Columns 1-3 of Table 5 show the effect of civil war, where a dummy variable equals 1 if a civil 
war occurred and 0 otherwise, for each year in our sample. Not surprisingly, we find that 
inflation increases when a country goes through a civil war. This finding is positive and 
statistically significant in the full sample and the non-CFA countries. A civil war increases 
inflation by a magnitude of 3.640 for non-CFA countries, but has no effect for CFA countries.26 
Columns 4-6 show the effect of coup d’état, a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a coup d’état 
and 0 otherwise, for each year in our sample. The effect of this variable is the same as the civil 
war variable except the point estimates are much larger for non-CFA countries. Columns 7-9 
reveal that these results still hold for both political stability measures when all of the other 
                                                          
25 Data on these variables were not available for many countries in our sample. 
26 This result is not surprising since in a monetary union, countries are unable to use seigniorage 





control variables are included. That is, the inclusion of stressful times’ indicators does not 
change our main conclusion that a high turnover rate of central bank governors causes an 
increase in inflation in the non-CFA and full samples, but leads to a statistically significant 
decrease in inflation for the CFA countries. 
 
c. Decomposing the TOR variable 
This section examines the impact of our new CBI measures on inflation. First, Table 6 presents 
the effects of premature turnover rates (TOR_PREM), which accounts for the frequency of 
central bank governors’ removal before the end of the first term, and non-premature turnover 
rates (TOR_NON-PREM),27 which accounts for central bank governors’ removal that occurs 
after the first term. Like Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we find that the non-premature removal of 
central bank governors does not result in higher inflation. In contrast, we find that the premature 
removal of central bank governors leads to a statistically significant fall in the inflation rate for 
the CFA countries. One possible explanation is that the removal of a central bank governor in the 
CFA zone may indicate that the central bank governor is a threat to the credibility and the 
stability of the zone, rather than a challenger to the government.28  
Second, Table 7 displays the effects of a central bank governor’s replacement that is an ally 
(TOR_ALLY) or a non-ally (TOR_NONALLY)29 on inflation. The results, in Columns 1-3, 
show that when a CFA central bank governor is replaced by an ally, inflation decreases more 
than when the replacement is a non-ally. 
                                                          
27 TOR= TOR_PREM + TOR_NONPREM 
28 We explain this finding further in the discussion section. 






Table 5: TOR (four-year TOR) regressions with control variables and stressful times variables 
   
 



















          
Four-year TOR 5.362*** 8.053*** -0.596 5.122** 7.927** -0.589 4.068** 4.061 -1.047**  
(1.932) (2.974) (0.541) (1.999) (3.089) (0.543) (1.821) (2.572) (0.461) 
Civil war 2.847*** 3.640*** -0.087 
   
2.222*** 1.683*** -0.185*  
(0.348) (0.498) (0.120) 
   
(0.355) (0.506) (0.104) 
Coup d’état 
   
4.306*** 7.714*** -0.010 2.316** 4.681*** 0.135     
(1.091) (1.846) (0.256) (1.002) (1.562) (0.218) 
World inflation 
      
2.129*** 2.455*** 0.384***        
(0.269) (0.416) (0.061) 
Trade openness 
      
-0.019 -0.148*** 0.004**        
(0.012) (0.032) (0.002) 
Log (Income) 
      
-3.985*** -17.010*** 1.593***        
(0.961) (2.643) (0.169) 
Government spending 
      
-0.532*** -0.391*** 0.085***        
(0.089) (0.135) (0.023) 
Number of observations 780 468 312 780 468 312 765 455 310 
R
2 0.091 0.121 0.006 0.030 0.053 0.004 0.227 0.388 0.308 





Vuletin and Zhu (2011) notes that a less-financially developed country might have more 
difficulty in finding suitable candidates for a central bank governor’s replacement. Thus, a 
government ALLY might be a proxy for lack of financial development30.  
Table 6: TOR_prem and TOR_non-prem regressions with control variables and political 
instability  
(1) (2) (3) 
   
Countries all countries non-cfa 
countries 
cfa countries 
   
       
Premature removals 0.834 -0.239 -1.339** 
   
 
(1.305) (1.634) (0.598) 
   
Non-premature removals -0.040 0.212 -0.588** 
   
 
(0.958) (1.380) (0.252) 
   
World inflation 1.299*** 1.512*** 0.421*** 
   
 
(0.124) (0.192) (0.031) 
   
Civil war 2.724*** 2.433*** -0.071 
   
 
(0.354) (0.498) (0.113) 
   
Coup d’état 2.145** 4.612*** 0.049 
   
 
(0.957) (1.526) (0.218) 
   
Trade openness -0.032** -0.170*** 0.004* 
   
 
(0.012) (0.031) (0.002) 
   
Log (Income) -4.142*** -13.302*** 1.420*** 
   
 
(0.963) (2.441) (0.178) 
   
Government spending -0.400*** -0.516*** -0.039*** 
   
 
(0.066) (0.127) (0.014) 
   
Number of observations 871 519 352 
   
R2 0.244 0.377 0.466 
   
Ho: β(TOR_nonprem) = 
β(TOR_prem) 
0.582 0.83 0.24 
  
Notes: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. The dependent variable is the inflation rate. Reported is the 
within 𝑹𝟐. Standard errors are robust and clustered. The regression is done with no intercept. 
 
To proxy for financial development and intermediation, like Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we 
examine the effects of liquid liabilities and private credit.31 Columns 4-9 in Table 7 show a 
statistically significant negative relationship between liquid liabilities and inflation; a statistically 
                                                          
30 See Vuletin and Zhu (2011). 





significant positive relationship between private credit and inflation in CFA countries. Moreover, 
even when we control for financial development, replacing a central bank governor with an ally 
or a non-ally still leads to a decrease in inflation for the CFA countries. 
Finally, the four dimensions of the TOR variables are interacted to create four new variables 
defined as follows: TOR_PREM & ALLY, TOR_PREM & NONALLY, TOR_NONPREM & 
ALLY, and TOR_NONPREM & NONALLY.32 Table 8 displays the effects of these variables on 
inflation. Premature changes followed by a replacement with an ally result in lower inflation for 
the CFA countries. That result differs from Vuletin and Zhu (2011) who find that when these two 
events occur, the inflation rate goes up and that is true when the replacement occupies a high 
position in the executive branch. 
 
                                                          
32 CFA countries do not have any observations for TOR_PREM & NONALLY. 
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Ally replacements 1.506 2.328 -1.229*** 1.369 2.352 -1.131*** 1.451 2.334 -0.772***  
(1.704) (2.561) (0.348) (1.701) (2.565) (0.303) (1.705) (2.563) (0.294) 
Non-Ally replacements -0.044 -0.124 -0.659*** -0.107 0.050 -0.749*** -0.053 -0.117 -0.683***  
(0.932) (1.249) (0.244) (0.930) (1.245) (0.216) (0.933) (1.250) (0.205) 
World inflation 1.325*** 1.523*** 0.499*** 1.331*** 1.555*** 0.353*** 1.322*** 1.545*** 0.307***  
(0.133) (0.201) (0.028) (0.132) (0.206) (0.029) (0.133) (0.206) (0.029) 
Civil war 2.806*** 3.119*** -0.234** 2.783*** 3.236*** -0.155 2.801*** 3.114*** -0.130  
(0.442) (0.635) (0.108) (0.441) (0.630) (0.096) (0.442) (0.636) (0.091) 
Coup d’état 2.171** 3.995** 0.142 2.165** 3.949** 0.112 2.177** 3.963** 0.220  
(1.017) (1.614) (0.194) (1.016) (1.618) (0.171) (1.018) (1.617) (0.163) 
Trade openness -0.040*** -0.205*** 0.004** -0.041*** -0.205*** 0.008*** -0.041*** -0.205*** 0.008***  
(0.014) (0.034) (0.002) (0.014) (0.034) (0.002) (0.014) (0.034) (0.002) 
Log (Income) -4.410*** -15.231*** 1.494*** -4.505*** -13.775*** 1.436*** -4.356*** -15.366*** 1.407***  
(1.047) (2.817) (0.162) (1.035) (2.574) (0.143) (1.049) (2.833) (0.135) 
Government spending -0.499*** -0.662*** 0.073*** -0.500*** -0.662*** 0.000 -0.488*** -0.669*** 0.008  
(0.094) (0.143) (0.020) (0.094) (0.144) (0.019) (0.095) (0.144) (0.018) 
Liquid liabilities -0.071 0.121 0.002 
   
-0.052 0.109 -0.086***  
(0.053) (0.078) (0.015) 
   
(0.058) (0.082) (0.015) 
Private credit 
   
-0.044 0.045 0.102*** -0.031 0.024 0.141***     
(0.035) (0.048) (0.011) (0.038) (0.050) (0.012) 
Number of observations 821 495 326 822 495 327 821 495 326 
R
2 0.224 0.361 0.612 0.224 0.359 0.696 0.225 0.362 0.729 





Table 8: TOR interactions regressions with control variables and political instability 
 







    
TOR_PREM & TOR_ALLY 2.760 3.198 -1.324*  
(1.942) (2.203) (0.726) 





TOR_NON-PREM & TOR_NON-ALLY -0.162 0.291 -0.411**  
(0.456) (0.787) (0.134) 
TOR_NON-PREM & TOR_ALLY -1.289 -3.126 -1.273***  
(1.727) (3.794) (0.378) 
World inflation 1.303*** 1.525** 0.419***  
(0.403) (0.662) (0.086) 
Civil war 2.730** 2.445 -0.078  
(1.316) (1.408) (0.131) 
Coup d’état 2.175 4.654* 0.045  
(1.422) (2.315) (0.249) 
Trade openness -0.033 -0.171*** 0.004**  
(0.037) (0.050) (0.001) 
Log (Income) -4.137 -13.414 1.441**  
(3.608) (8.637) (0.533) 
Government spending -0.395** -0.488 -0.039  
(0.182) (0.353) (0.048) 
Ho: β(TOR_NON-PREM&NON-ALLY) = 
β(TOR_NON-PREM &ALLY) 
0.54 0.34 0.06 
Ho: β(TOR_NON-PREM &NON-ALLY) = 
β(TOR_PREM & NON-ALLY) 
0.867 0.475 0.011 
Ho: β(TOR_NON-PREM&NON-ALLY) = 
β(TOR_PREM &ALLY) 
0.164 0.331 0.279 
Ho: β(TOR_NON-PREM&ALLY) = 
β(TOR_PREM&NON-ALLY) 
0.85 0.541 0.006 
Ho: β(TOR_NON-PREM &ALLY) = 
β(TOR_PREM&ALLY) 
0.153 0.16 0.953 
Ho: β(TOR_PREM&NON-ALLY) = 
β(TOR_PREM&ALLY) 
0.211 0.137 0.095 
Number of observations 871 519 352 
R2 0.246 0.381 0.469 
Notes: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. The dependent variable is inflation rate. Reported is the within 𝑹𝟐. 







d. Discussion of results 
The findings in the previous sections indicate that our new CBI measures lead to a decrease in 
inflation for the CFA countries. Vuletin and Zhu (2011) find the opposite effect in their sample 
of developed and developing countries. An obvious reason why our results differ is we include 
countries that are part of a monetary union while Vuletin and Zhu (2011) only examine countries 
with their own central banks and their own currencies. 
 Our results can be explained by the fact that the nomination process of both the BEAC and the 
BCEAO central bank governors, in practice, is done by the two largest economies in the West 
African and Central African regions, Ivory Coast and Gabon, respectively. Thus, these two 
countries are effectively selecting the central bank governor.33The de facto nomination process 
of central bank governors both in WAEMU and CAEMC34 has led Ivory Coast and Gabon to 
choose central bank governors who will implement monetary policies that favor their national 
economies rather than the economic well-being of the whole CFA zone. In this context, a 
premature removal means a central bank governor is perceived as a challenger, not by Ivory 
Coast or Gabon, but by the other heads of state of the member countries. It is important to note 
that although the nomination process is done by these two countries, the firing or the premature 
removal of a central bank governor requires all the heads of state in each of the CFA zones35.  
A CFA central bank governor who is perceived as pushing economic policies favorable to Ivory 
Coast or Gabon or whose behavior can be viewed as detrimental to the credibility or the stability 
                                                          
33 See Guillaume and Stasavage (2000). It is worth noting that although the de facto nomination 
process existed for the entirety of our sample, it is no longer in practice today. 
34 CAEMC stands for Central African Economic and Monetary Community and is the regulatory 
body of the BEAC. 
35 Though this implies that Ivory Coast or Gabon can thus block a vote to remove the central 
bank governor of their choice; in practice, what is observed, is that if the majority of the CFA 





of the zone can be removed or fired by the unanimous approval of all the member countries’ 
heads of state. Thus, the removal of a CFA governor should lead to a decrease in inflation in the 
entire zone rather than an increase. For example, inflation fell following the removal of BEAC 
governor Philibert Andzembe in 2010 when he was discovered that he was implicated in an 
embezzlement scandal.  
For countries that are part of a monetary union, the temptation to put national considerations first 
is often curtailed by the need to meet specific criteria. In the CFA zone, countries must have an 
average inflation rate of less than 3%, a debt-to-GDP ratio of 70%, and a fiscal balance-to-GDP 
ratio that is balanced or in surplus. These criteria, however, often fail to account for the level of 
heterogeneity that exists between regions and within each region and the presence of 
asymmetries in the CFA zone gives countries very little incentive to respect these criteria, even if 
when doing so, their behaviors can be harmful to the well-being of the monetary union. 
In the case of the CFA zone, average per capita income in CAEMC is almost twice that of 
WAEMU. In the West African region, however, there is a higher level of financial development 
and more intra-regional trade.36 The WAEMU zone is more prone to fiscal imbalances, while 
countries of the CAEMC zone have accumulated fiscal surpluses. The differences in fiscal 
balances are due to WAEMU countries being primarily agricultural commodities exporters, 
while the CAEMC countries primarily export oil. 
The economic heterogeneity of countries has made it difficult for the members of the CFA zone 
to respect the convergence criteria mentioned above. Table 9 shows CAEMC countries have had 
an easier time maintaining fiscal surpluses than WAEMU countries. The same holds true for 
debt-to-GDP ratio with the biggest violator being Guinea-Bissau. It is not surprising then that 
                                                          





when it comes to adjustment policies or fiscal reaction functions; Ivory Coast and Gabon have 
been more inclined to consider their own national economic circumstances than the Franc zone’s 
overall well-being.37 
Our results indicate that the replacement of a central bank governor by an ally (TOR_ALLY) is 
negatively related to inflation, whereas Vuletin and Zhu (2011) find that inflation is five times 
higher for all samples. We speculate that the differences in our findings are due to the definition 
of ally in our sample. In their paper, Vuletin and Zhu (2011), define ally as a central bank  
 
 Table 9: Comparison of fiscal imbalances between CEMAC and WAEMU 
 
Source: Gulde and Tsangarides (2008). 
 
governor’s replacement that comes from a ministry or top executive branch. This paper also 
considers a governor an ally if he or she comes from the same political party or the same tribe as 
the nominating president. Our data sample indicates only two instances for CFA countries, in 
which a central bank governor replacement is an ally. None of these replacements are ministers 
                                                          





or heads of government agencies. This fact implies that the effect of the origin of the central 


























Table 10: CEMAC AND WAEMU history  
      
Fiscal balance criteria: nonnegative 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
CEMAC 
       
Cameroon -7.5 -3.8 -2.4 2 0.8 0 3.2 
Central African Republic -5.8 -3.1 -0.7 -1.9 -0.5 -3.9 0.4 
Chad -5.3 -1.4 -0.4 -3.1 -3.2 -0.2 2.5 
Congo -12.4 -6.9 -15.9 7.1 -0.8 9.2 32.6 
Equatorial Guinea -2.7 2.9 -0.5 9.5 11.5 9.9 15.7 
Gabon 1.8 11 -1.3 13.9 6.8 11 15.1 
Number of countries violating 5 5 6 2 3 2 0 
WAEMU 
       
Benin -0.9 1.3 3.3 1.9 0.1 -0.4 0.1 
Burkina Faso -2.7 0.6 -0.5 -1.4 -3.7 -3.1 -4.3 
Cote d ivoire -3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.3 -2 
Guinea-Bissau -7.9 -4.3 -16.4 -16.8 -9 -13.7 -15.9 
Mali -3.1 0.8 0.2 -0.6 -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 
Niger -7 -1.7 -3.3 -3 -1.8 -2.2 -1.8 
Senegal -2.3 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.8 -0.7 -3.5 
Togo -8.3 -3.6 -3 -2.7 0.3 1.4 -2.7 
Number of countries violating 8 4 5 6 5 7 7         
        
Total debt/GDP (less or equal 70%) 
       
        
CEMAC 
       
Cameroon 145.6 85.4 81.1 80.4 50.1 44.2 3.1 
Central African Republic 94.8 89.9 83.9 80.3 91.4 93.6 82.3 
Chad 62.3 54.3 54.2 72.3 57.2 35 23.7 
Congo 270.2 212.2 264.4 164.9 200.9 229.6 82.5 
Equatorial Guinea 218.1 92.9 59.7 36.3 10.2 6.2 2.7 
Gabon 86.4 71.1 84.9 57 65.6 40.1 34.2 
Number of countries violating 5 5 4 4 2 2 2 
WAEMU 
       
Benin 82 65.7 65.8 71.8 66.6 49.8 22.1 
Burkina Faso 51.6 44.6 46.4 63 51.4 34.8 8.9 
Cote d ivoire 176.1 133.2 84.9 108 88.9 88.7 177.4 
Guinea-Bissau 378.2 326.1 449 353.8 419.4 379.4 326.2 
Mali 116.4 101.3 100.3 99.5 90.2 66.9 27.7 
Niger 101.9 76.6 77.9 94.5 81 55.6 14.6 
Senegal 84.1 80.4 85.2 76.2 82.2 67.3 44.9 
Togo 121.1 85.6 79.7 98.2 93.9 79.6 67.6 
Number of countries violating 7 6 6 7 6 3 2 






This paper adds to the literature on CBI by examining central bank independence in a monetary 
union framework and by creating more suitable measures of de facto CBI for developing 
countries. Since the existing literature shows de jure measures of CBI are inappropriate for 
developing countries because of the poor quality of their institutions. Novel measures introduced 
by Vuletin and Zhu (2011) are used and extended to the African context, to better assess the 
effect of CBI on inflation in developing countries. Specifically, we collect data on central bank 
governor changes and classify these changes as premature (before the end of the official term) 
and non-premature and determine whether a central bank governor’s replacement can be 
classified as ally or non-ally depending on their connections to the nominating president. 
Our findings show that the traditional de facto measure of CBI explains some of the variation in 
inflation rate both in the full sample and the non-CFA countries. When that measure is 
deconstructed, however, the evidence indicates that both premature and non-premature changes 
of central bank governors lead to a decrease in inflation rates for CFA countries. The results also 
show that inflation in CFA countries under a central bank governor who is an ally is lower than 
when the central bank governor is a non-ally. Those results are in contrast to Vuletin and Zhu 
(2011) who find that both premature removals of central bank governors and ally replacements 
lead to an increase in inflation. We argue that this difference is due to the presence of 
mechanisms in a monetary union to prevent countries from engaging in behaviors that can be 
harmful to the union. Therefore, the premature exit of a CFA central bank governor who is 
perceived to be a challenger is beneficial to the whole zone’s economic well-being and should 





Our paper also suggests the Cukierman index is not appropriate to study the relationship between 
CBI and inflation in Africa. Instead, it is essential to account for the frequency of central bank 
governors ‘changes and the nature of the replacement of central bank governors, given the 
authoritarian regimes that often govern African countries. African central bank governors often 
encounter harsher political pressures compared to peers in their developed countries when 
implementing monetary policy and fighting against inflation. Consequently, African countries 
should not be grouped with other developing countries when studying de facto CBI.  
Finally, our paper also shows that the relationship between CBI and inflation is different when a 
country belongs to a monetary union. In an African context, in which countries often suffer 
credibility and thus time-inconsistency problems, a monetary union provides monetary discipline 
which in turn ensures that the common central bank remains independent. Thus future studies on 






























































































UEMOA: stands for West African monetary union (also known as WAEMU) and include west 
African countries that have the west African CFA as a currency: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.  
 
CEMAC: stands for Central African Economic and Monetary Union and include central African 
countries that have the central African CFA as their currency: Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. 
 














      
Source 
   
Inflation inflation rate calculation 
is based on CPI 







inflation rates in G7 countries 
measured by the consumer price 
index 
   
OECD data 




does a central bank has 
an explicit inflation 
target? 




   
Exchange 
rate regimes 
takes a value of 1 if fixed 
exchange rate regime 1 and 0 
otherwise 
    
IMF regime 
classifications 




proxied by civil war and 
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Liquid 
Liabilities 
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value of credits by financial 
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Premature takes a value of 1 if CB governor changes 
before the expiration of his/her first term; 0 
otherwise. 
 
various CB websites and 
based on author's calculations 
Ally 1 if member of executive branch (see ministries table 
A1), high ranking member of ruling party or same 
tribe, 0 otherwise  
various CB websites and 
based on author's calculations 












Development economists have long debated the causes for Africa’s growth puzzle. While some 
pundits have pointed to the legacy of colonialism and its long-lasting effect on the quality of 
institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Nunn, 2008), others have blamed geography for the high 
level of pauperization faced by the continent today (Bloom et al. 1998). Monetary independence, 
or lack thereof, has not received much attention in the economics literature as an explanatory 
factor behind Africa’s economic stagnation. Indeed, after independence, many African countries 
abandoned colonial currencies such as the British West African Pound or the Portuguese Escudo 
for their own national currency and for their own central banks. Most former French colonies, 
however, chose to remain in the CFA zone and maintain their peg to the French franc or the euro 
today.  At the time, monetary independence was seen as a symbol of nationalism or even 
patriotism but many of these new national currencies substantially declined in value and became 
inconvertible. It became clearer to some African countries that regional monetary integration 
might be a solution to their joint goals of nationalism or independence and economic stability. 
In recent decades, several initiatives have been proposed to increase the level of regional 
monetary integration. For example, in 2000, the East African Community comprised of Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania was revived with the goal of establishing a 
common currency and building a political federation. Existing monetary blocks such as the CFA 
zone38 also extended their scope by putting in place economic unions such as the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) for their West African Members in 1994 or the 
                                                          
38 Although this monetary union is often referred to as the “CFA zone”, this term is somewhat 
misleading because the CFA zone in reality consists of two different monetary zones and the 





Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) for the Central African 
members in 1995. Recently, there has been a renewed debate about the CFA zone across the 
continent. Several African pundits have called for the dismantling of the CFA zone by arguing it 
is an insidious form of neo-colonialism that curtails the sovereignty of these countries vis-à-vis 
France. Critics of the zone also argue that the economic shocks faced by CFA members are 
different from the shocks faced by France and the European Union.39 Thus, the CFA zone’s 
central banks cannot easily respond to their economies’ shocks. The level of political instability 
in many African countries means exchange rate targeting is not necessarily the appropriate 
monetary policy tool, as countries might not be able to resist the temptation to monetize their 
debts. Also, African countries often have fiscal imbalances which make them more likely to use 
the seigniorage tax. This fact is especially true for African central banks because they have a 
lower degree of de facto central bank independence relative to more developed countries. In that 
case, however, a monetary union might be a second-best solution to enhance the monetary 
credibility and stability of these countries. 
Empirical studies have shown that membership in the CFA zone is correlated with a higher level 
of price stability (see Yehoue, 2007; Coulibaly and Davis, 2013). For example, the impact of the 
CFA is particularly noticeable when comparing the growth performance of CFA countries to 
non-CFA countries. Devarajan and Melo (1987) find that CFA countries grew faster than non-
CFA countries from 1960-1982. Furthermore, Coulibaly and Davis (2013) find that CFA zone 
countries grow 1 or 2 percentage points faster than non-CFA countries. Other researchers have 
investigated the effect of monetary integration on FDI and trade. Cham (2016) found that 
monetary integration in the West African Monetary zone led to an increase in FDI and trade. 
                                                          





Carrere (2004), Masson and Patillo (2004), and Bangake and Eggoh (2017) find that membership 
in a currency union has also increased the level of trade between country members; while Nitsch 
(2002) finds that monetary integration has no effect on interregional trade. 
This paper analyzes the effect of the CFA zone on short run business cycles indicators such as 
income per capita and inflation as well as long-term economic indicators such as trade relations 
with France and foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper contributes to the literature on CFA 
monetary integration and monetary integration in several ways. One, to our knowledge, this 
paper is the first to use the synthetic control method (SCM) to assess the gains of joining a 
monetary union on macroeconomic fundamentals as well as long-term economic prospects. This 
paper differs from the literature on the effect of trade on currency unions in several ways: 1)The 
seminal paper by Andrew Rose and Jeffrey Frankel uses gravity models to estimate the effect of 
currency union on output and trade, whereas our paper uses the synthetic control method. This 
technique, first introduced by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2003), is a comparative 
studies approach that assesses the trend that the affected unit, Mali, would have followed in the 
absence of the treatment, CFA zone’s membership. The synthetic control method controls for the 
effect of time-varying unobservables unlike traditional methods such as fixed effects or 
difference-in-differences.; 2) This paper differs from other papers in the literature because of its 
narrow focus on the CFA zone. The distinction between the CFA zone and other currency unions 
such as the European Monetary Union is essential. Indeed, the former is a legacy of colonialism 
and any assessment of the effect of currency unions on macroeconomic fundamentals cannot be 
separated from also taking into account the effect of colonial legacy as highlighted by Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) on development; 3) to our knowledge, we are the first to test the effect of joining the 





unconventional, given that most of the literature has focused on gauging whether or not 
monetary integration increases trade between member countries. We argue, however, that the 
CFA is a former French colonial currency and till this day, the zone maintains strong political 
and economic ties with France. Two, while previous studies have concentrated on countries that 
are already members of the CFA zone, our paper examines whether or not Mali would have 
achieved better economic outcomes by retaining its own currency instead of joining the CFA 
zone. 
Our analysis consists of comparing Mali,40 a former French colony that left the CFA zone after 
independence but rejoined the union in 1984, to a counterfactual constructed from a set of 
appropriate donor countries that were not exposed to the treatment, countries that did not join the 
CFA zone. Using the SCM, we can identify the direct effects of joining the CFA zone on GDP 
per capita, the inflation rate, FDI, and our total trade measure.41 Our results indicate that joining 
a monetary union, such as the CFA zone, has a statistically significant impact on GDP per capita, 
inflation, and FDI. Specifically, Mali’s GDP per capita and FDI rose and its inflation rate 
immediately fell after joining the CFA zone. We, however, find that joining the CFA zone had 
no effect on Mali’s total trade with France.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the CFA zone. Section 3 
outlines the theoretical framework. Section 4 discusses the SCM method. Section 5 presents the 
                                                          
40 There are two other countries that were late joiners of the CFA zone: Equatorial Guinea who 
joined in 1985 and Guinea-Bissau who joined in 1997. Although our analysis would have ideally 
studied these two cases, we are unable to include Equatorial Guinea because of data limitations, 
specifically, for the pre-treatment period. Guinea-Bissau, in contrast, went through a civil war 
approximately one year after joining the CFA zone, which would confound any observed effects 
because joining the CFA and the war are contemporaneous events. 





data and the variables. Section 6 examines the results. Section 7 tests the robustness of our 
results and section 8 concludes. 
 
2.2 Historical background of the CFA zone 
At to the end of WWII, several colonial powers formed monetary arrangements (e.g., CFA 
zones) whose sole purpose was to strengthen the ties between the colonies and the metropole. 
These arrangements included the creation of monetary institutions that served as the foundations 
for today’s African monetary institutions. The CFA42 Franc was introduced in 1945 and was 
pegged to the French Franc at 1 CFA franc for 1.7 French Francs.43 As mentioned earlier, there 
are two zones, each with its own regulating agency. The Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CAEMC) consists of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Congo and uses a currency denoted XAF issued by their region’s 
central bank (BEAC). The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) includes 
Benin, Burkina-Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo and uses a 
currency denoted XOF issued by their region’s central bank (BCEAO).44 
While many former British and Portuguese colonies opted to leave the colonial currency system 
behind in favor of a national currency, most French colonies opted to preserve the monetary 
relationship with France.45 Even though their central bank’s charters have changed over time, the 
CFA remained pegged to the French Franc and the most noteworthy feature of the franc 
                                                          
42 CFA in French means Colonies Francaises d ‘Afrique. 
43 Masson and Pattillo (2005, p. 15). 
44 BEAC stands for Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale and BCEAO stands for Banque Centrale des Etats de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest in French. 
45 Former French colonies such as Madagascar or Mauritania left the zone and created their own currencies in 1973. 
Following independence, Mali initially left in 1962 and replaced the CFA with the Malian Franc but rejoined the 






monetary union, the operations account system, was upheld.46 The operations account guarantees 
unlimited access of the two central banks to the French Franc prior to 1999 and to the Euro 
thereafter, via the Bank of France. For most countries with fixed exchanges rates, the national 
central banks are required to maintain the announced fixed rate. This is done by ensuring that the 
central bank maintains a sufficient reserve of foreign currencies. For CFA zone countries, in 
contrast, the parity of the CFA with the Euro is maintained by the French Treasury, which 
essentially eliminates the potential problem of having too few foreign reserves. In exchange, the 
CFA zone countries were required to deposit all their external assets and earnings in their 
operations account at the French Treasury. Since 2005, the Central African countries and West 
African countries are only required to deposit 50% and 60%, respectively, of their earnings. 
Other notable features of the CFA zone include: 1) The board of directors for each central bank 
must include French representatives (i.e., 2 for the BEAC, 3 for BCEAO, and 4 for the Central 
bank of Comoros); 2) The CFA currencies are legal tenders only in their respective zones; 3) 
Free capital mobility exists between the two zones and France; and 4) The CFA is pegged to the 
euro at a fixed rate of 1 euro=655,957 CFA Franc. 
The devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 was a major event that impacted the zone. The 
member countries were losing their competitive edge because their currency was overvalued. 
Prices of key exports such as cocoa (Ivory Coast) or petroleum (Gabon) were falling which led to 
the deterioration of these countries’ current accounts. To restore competitiveness, the CFA franc 
peg with the French Franc was changed from 50CFA to 100CFA for 1 French Franc. The 
devaluation of the CFA was one of the conditions attached to the structural adjustments packages 
provided by the World Bank and the IMF to these African countries. It was also accompanied by 
                                                          
46 It is important to note that both BEAC and BCEAO maintain separate operations account with 





the creation of the UEMOA and CEMAC to facilitate banking supervision, regional integration, 
and coordination of both fiscal and monetary policies within the CFA zone. 
 
 
2.3 Conceptual framework 
The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas in Mundell (1961) outlines many of the benefits of 
joining a currency union. Mundell defines a currency area as a geographic region in which 
member countries share the same currency and have a fixed exchange rate. According to 
Mundell, an optimal currency area should abide by the following four principles: 
1. The mobility of the factors of production: Mobility across countries lessens the need for 
exchange rate adjustment and also keeps markets at equilibrium. In the case of the 
Eurozone, a decrease in the demand for French goods and an increase in the demand for 
German goods will lead to unemployment in France and inflation in Germany. Mundell 
argues that if labor is mobile, then these two problems can be averted. 
2. Political integration: Countries must be willing to follow similar monetary and fiscal 
policies in order for the currency union to be successful. For example, Eurozone 
countries were required to sign the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which provides 
fiscal surveillance of the members by the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers as well as guidelines for each government’s deficit (3% of GDP) and debt (60% 
of GDP). Countries that do not follow those restrictions can have economic sanctions 
imposed on them. 
3. Fiscal integration: Countries must be willing to engage in a certain level of risk sharing. 





spillover effect, other member countries must provide fiscal transfers to help the country 
experiencing the shock. 
4. Trade openness and regional integration: Sharing a common currency can improve trade, 
particularly for small economies. Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) have shown that 
countries, which join a currency union, can increase trade by about 400 percent. Using a 
gravity model, Glick and Rose (2001) find that trade is higher for countries in currency 
unions than for countries with their own currency. 
The four principles listed above are central to the theoretical argument in favor of a monetary 
union. Another benefit from joining a currency union is that monetary discipline is imposed on 
member countries. For example, a country with its own currency and monetary independence 
might be more willing to use expansionary monetary policy in response to domestic or external 
shocks. Countries that abuse this policy tool can gain credibility from joining a currency union 
via lower money supply growth, and thus, experience a decrease in their inflation rate (Edwards, 
1992 and Ghosh, 1996). Thus, a monetary union promotes discipline and enhances credibility, 
which leads to a lower level of inflation. 
In terms of income and growth, a flexible exchange rate gives a country the ability to use 
monetary policy to respond to economic disturbances. Countries that are exporters of primary 
commodities tend to use monetary policy in response to negative shocks. Membership in a 
currency union or fixed exchange rate, however, makes it more difficult for member countries to 
respond to economic distortions. Nevertheless, income can increase because trade among 
member countries tends to rise. Using data on 200 countries, Frankel and Rose (2001) show that 
for every one percent increase in trade, income per capita goes up by one-third of a percent over 





regimes are better equipped to respond to economic disturbances (Broda, 2002 and Edwards and 
Levy-Yeyati, 2005). 
There are some potential costs of membership in a currency union. Countries who face different 
asymmetric shocks from other members might not find it beneficial to join a currency union. 
Since countries in a currency union do not have the ability to respond to adverse economic 
shocks using monetary policy, countries that are more concerned about inflation might find it 
hard to reconcile their monetary policy objectives with countries that are more concerned by 
unemployment. In addition, a common monetary policy is optimal when there is mobility of 
labor and diversification of the economy as well as similar production or exports patterns 
(Masson and Pattillo, 2005). Fiscal and political integration also depend on the quality of 
institutions (Guillaume and Stasavage, 2000). For example, for a pact such as the SGP to be 
sustainable, countries need to have a certain level of fiscal discipline and avoid beggar-thy-
neighbor policies. Consequently, for a currency area to be optimal, the composition of the 
currency union is fundamental. For example, the European Monetary Union is credible because 
its foundation as a monetary institution stems from the German Bundesbank, which is well-
known for its stellar discipline. 
 
2.4  The empirical method: the synthetic control approach 
a. The method 
Our identification strategy consists of comparing the trends in outcome variables of the country 
exposed to our treatment with that of a counterfactual constructed using a donor pool of 
countries. That procedure is the core of the SCM developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 





this method because it uses several donor countries rather than one country to build a more 
precise counterfactual. This difference allows for a better representation of the treated unit and 
removes the difficulty of finding just one donor country. Thus, the counterfactual consists of a 
weighted average of possible donor countries that best reproduces the initial trends or 
characteristics of the treated country before the intervention occurs. Another advantage of this 
method is that the contribution of each potential control to the construction of the counterfactual 
is made explicit to the researcher. Finally, the SCM is flexible because it allows the researcher to 
appropriately choose donor countries that are closely matched to the treated country. 
The trend followed by the counterfactual in the absence of the treatment represents the outcome 
that the variables of the treated country would have followed without the intervention. In our 
case, our outcome variables consists of GDP per capita, the inflation rate, a trade measure that 
consists of the ratio of trade to France to trade with the rest of the world, and FDI. The treated 
unit, Mali, is exposed to the intervention at different periods, while the treatment consists of 
joining the CFA zone which it did in 1984. 
The SCM uses a sample of i + 1 countries indexed by i where country i = 1 is the country that is 
receiving the treatment. Our sample is a balanced panel consisting of 14 countries including Mali 
observed over a period t = 1,…., T; where 𝑇0 represents the number of years Mali was not a CFA 
zone country (pre-treatment) and T- 𝑇0 represents the number of years Mali was a CFA zone 
member (post-treatment). Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡 be the outcome of Mali at time t and 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) and 𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) be the 
potential outcome of country i pre- and post-treatment, respectively. Thus, the observed effect 
can be captured by 𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) - 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) in pre-treatment or 𝑌𝑖𝑡 (1) = 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 in 
post-treatment. This relationship can be estimated using the following factor model: 





                        𝑌𝑖𝑡 (1) =  𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝑍𝑖𝑡                     (2) 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑡  = 𝜃𝑡𝑋𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡𝜇𝑖 +  𝑖𝑡. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of observed explanatory variables, 𝜃𝑡 is a vector of 
unknown parameters, 𝛾𝑡 consists of unobserved common factors, 𝜇𝑖 is a vector of country-
specific unobservables and 𝑖𝑡 is a zero-mean error term. Suppose 𝑋1 is a vector of pre-treatment 
characteristics of Mali while 𝑋0 is a vector of the same characteristics for the donor countries.
47 
The SCM then minimizes the difference between 𝑋1 and 𝑋0 which is given by 𝑋1- 𝑋0𝑊, where 
W is a vector of weights on the donor countries such that 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 and ∑ 𝑤𝑖= 1: 
 min
𝑤
√(𝑋1 −  𝑋0𝑊)’V(𝑋1  −  𝑋0𝑊)      (3) 
where V is some symmetric positive semidefinite matrix. The SCM selects 𝑤∗such that the 
estimator of 𝛽𝑖𝑡 is given by the comparison between the outcome for Mali and the outcome for 
the synthetic control for the donor countries during the pre-treatment period:48 




𝑗=2     (4) 
The weights on the donor countries are chosen so that the weighted averages match Mali as 
closely as possible.  
b. Statistical significance 
Traditional statistical inferential techniques are not practical with the SCM because the sample 
size is usually small. Furthermore, there is no random sampling since researchers can choose the 
sample units themselves. Thus, the SCM relies on weaker assumptions than traditional methods 
such as differences-in-differences, which often require the common trend assumption to hold, or 
                                                          
47 Note that these characteristics may include the pre-intervention values of the outcome variable 
as well. 





panel data methods such as fixed effects which control only for time-invariant factors (fixed 
effects).   
Abadie et al. (2010) show placebo studies provide an alternative way to assess the statistical 
significance of the results. Placebo studies are based on the assumption that control units that did 
not experience the treatment should not have similar or larger trends, like Mali, in outcomes 
variables in the post-treatment period. If that were the case, then the validity of the SCM will be 
severely undermined and it could imply the effect was observed by chance. There are two types 
of placebo studies. One, in-time placebos are conducted by re-assigning the time of the 
intervention. In our case, we could assume Mali joins the CFA zone in 1975 instead of 1984. 
This “false treatment” should not result in large effects, otherwise, it will be difficult to pin the 
“joining of the Franc zone” as a reason for the observed trends in our outcome variables. Two, 
in-place placebos assign the treatment sequentially to all the control units and compare the 
results with those obtained for our treated unit. If we observe a smaller effect of the treatment on 
our control units, our baseline results generated by the SCM are valid. 
In this paper, we conduct in-place placebo tests, and despite the absence of randomization, the 
distribution of in-place placebos can be captured by p-values, which have the interpretation of 
being the probability of obtaining an estimated effect at least as large as that of the treated 
country.49 We calculate these p-values in the following way: 




where ?̂?1tPL = ?̂?it : (i ≠ 1) is the distribution of in-place placebos effects. 
 
 
                                                          







c. Data and variables 
Our sample consists of 14 countries (including Mali) of annual data for 1970-1995.50 The data on 
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$), inflation rate (CPI), trade openness (imports and exports as 
a % of GDP), and industry value added (% of GDP) are from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators. Other predictors that we include in our Xi vector include indicators of 
political instability such as political regimes, civil wars, or democracy; from the Cheibub data set 
(see Cheibub et al. 2010). The data on FDI, net inflows, in current $) is from the United Nations 
databank. Finally, we create a total trade measure (exports plus imports) using the ratio of total 
trade with France to total trade with the rest of the world. That data is from the MIT media lab 
observatory of economic complexity. We conduct a separate analysis for Mali, for each of our 
outcome variables, where the pre-treatment period consists of 14 years (1970-1984) and the post-
treatment period is 11 years (1984-1995.  
Our sample of donor countries in our sample includes: Algeria, Bangladesh, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Honduras, Malawi, Mauritania, Nepal, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tunisia. Ideally, we would prefer to limit our sample to African 
countries with similar socio-economic conditions but to increase our chances of finding the best 
match for Mali’s counterfactual, we also include non-African countries such as Bangladesh, 
Honduras, and Nepal. 
 
 
                                                          







    2.5   Results 
This section explains how we construct a synthetic version for Mali as well as the results of our 
natural experiment for each outcome variable. 
a. GDP per capita 
Our results show that the synthetic Mali consists of four countries with the following weights: 
Malawi (.927), Egypt (.038), Sudan (.027), and Burundi (.008). Table 2 shows the pre-treatment 
characteristics of Mali and synthetic Mali. Overall, synthetic Mali is similar to Mali in the pre-
treatment period, particularly in terms of GDP per capita.51 The left panel of Figure 1 shows the 
trajectory of GPD per capita for Mali and the counterfactual over a 25-year period. Synthetic 
Mali matches Mali really well before Mali joins the CFA zone, then both units immediately start 
to diverge. This finding indicates joining the CFA zone had a positive effect on Mali’s GDP per 
capita. Next, we run in-place placebo tests where we assign the treatment to all countries in the 
donor pool. The right 
panel of Figure 1 shows the computed p-values to assess the statistical significance of our results. 
These p-values show that joining the CFA zone leads to a statistically significant (p-value less 
than 0.1) increase in GDP per capita in the first 6 periods after treatment but then the results 
become statistically insignificant. Overall, our analysis shows that Mali experienced an increase 
in its GDP per capita, immediately after joining the CFA zone. 
 
 
                                                          







Figure 1: GDP PER CAPITA and significance levels for GDP 
  
b. Inflation 
Our inflation results show that synthetic Mali consists of Burundi (.54), Malawi (.22), Nepal 
(.22), and Sudan (.02). Table 3 illustrates that synthetic Mali’s pretreatment characteristics are 
very similar to that of Mali, especially for the inflation rate and political instability. The left 
panel of Figure 3 shows that synthetic Mali does a good job matching Mali’s inflation rate in the 
pre-treatment period. Figure 2 displays the trends in inflation in the pre-treatment and the post-
treatment periods. As predicted by the theory, Mali experiences a huge drop in its inflation rate, 
once it joins the CFA zone. 7 years after joining the CFA zone, inflation was 10% lower in Mali 
than in synthetic Mali. The results from the placebo tests in the right panel of Figure 2 show, 
joining the CFA zone initially produces a statistically significant reduction in Mali’s inflation 
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Figure 2: Inflation and significance levels for GDP 
 
 
c.  Trade with France 
In terms of trade with France, synthetic Mali consists of Mauritania (.845) and Algeria (.155). 
Table 4 shows the pre-treatment predictors for Mali and synthetic Mali. Except for the predictors 
of the variable trade with France, the synthetic Mali does not match the trajectory of total trade 
for Mali very well. This result is also evident in Figure 3. The left panel shows a downward trend 
in trade with France in the post-treatment period for both Mali and synthetic Mali. The results of 
our placebo tests in the right panel of Figure 3 indicate that any difference between Mali and 
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Figure 3: Trade relations with France and significance levels 
  
d. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Due to the lack of data, the SCM for FDI is run from 1976-1994 and only includes 8 countries: 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Honduras, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Synthetic Mali for FDI, however, only consists of Bangladesh (1). 
Table 5 shows the predictors of FDI before joining the CFA zone for Bangladesh and Mali. 
Except for GDP per capita and industry value added, synthetic Mali follows the same trend as 
Mali. Our results from the left panel of Figure 4 shows that both Mali and synthetic Mali follow 
the same trend even after Mali joins the CFA zone but then around 1994, Mali experiences one-
time jump in FDI. The in-place placebo results reveal some of these differences are statistically 
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2.6 Robustness tests 
 a. Removing neighboring countries:  
 This section examines the robustness of our results. We began by excluding from our donor pool 
countries that are direct neighbors to Mali. This change controls for any external spillover effects 
that Mali joining the CFA zone might have on neighboring countries that are not part of the CFA 
zone via economic ties such as trade linkages or through output (that is, changes in the terms of 
trade). To conduct this, we remove Mauritania and Algeria from our sample and re-run the SCM. 
Results are reported in Figure 3 panel A. The findings from our baseline analysis are confirmed 
by these robustness tests. The only difference comes from FDI where the differences between 
Mali and synthetic Mali become statistically significant in the last three years of our post-
treatment period. 
Figure 4: FDI and significance levels 
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A second robustness check consists of removing the countries with the highest weight in the 
construction of our synthetic Mali. This exercise examines whether our results are driven by a 
specific country. We rerun our SCM for GDP per capita, Inflation, total trade and FDI and for 
Mali; we remove Malawi, Burundi, Mauritania, and Bangladesh respectively. The results for 
Mali are shown in Figure 3 panel B in the appendix and are consistent with our earlier findings, 




This article uses the SCM to examine the effect of Mali joining the CFA zone on GDP per 
capita, inflation, total trade and FDI. The SCM procedure consists of comparing the trend that 
Mali followed after joining the CFA zone, versus its trend in the absence of treatment. Overall, 
we find that Mali joining the CFA zone leads to statistically significant effects on GDP per 
capita, inflation, and FDI. Mali experienced an increase in GDP per capita and a decrease in 
inflation but contrary to previous papers, we find no evidence of any effect on trade relations 
with France after joining the CFA zone. The SCM gives researchers the ability to directly assess 
the immediate economic effects from a country joining the CFA zone. These findings are 
especially relevant for countries that are considering joining the CFA zone or other proposed 













Table 2: Balancing properties: 
Table 2A: Balancing properties for GDP per capita 
 
Mali Synthetic Mali 
Industry value added 15.87098 22.22112 
Trade openness 4.844904 5.332605 
Inflation 0.5417 1.549011 
Political regime 4 3.037 
Civil war 0 0 
GDP per capita (1980) 435.8286 437.492 
GDP per capita (1977) 440.1837 433.7181 




Table 2B: Balancing properties for inflation  
Mali Synthetic Mali 
Industry value added 12.69474 14.36146 
Trade openness 40.66842 36.28375 
GDP per capita 415.1651 314.486 
Political regime 4 4 
Civil war 0 0 
Inflation (1979) 11.0852 10.33433 
Inflation (1975) 9.889476 11.02517 











Table 2C: Balancing properties for total trade 
  
Mali Synthetic Mali 
GDP per capita 411.7612 1495.903 
Industry value added 12.62204 33.9415 
regime 4 3.517143 
Civil war 0 0.3017857 
Inflation 9.52982 9.378332 
Total trade (1980) 0.347748 0.3259796 
Total trade (1975) 0.360232 0.376407 





Table 2D: Balancing properties for FDI 
 
 
Mali Synthetic Mali 
GDP per capita 436.3355 359.7806 
Industry value added 13.02318 18.51078 
regime 4 3.857143 
Civil war 0 0 
Inflation 10.52334 12.32801 
FDI (1982) 3946759 2336785 
FDI (1979) 2132444 4583334 

















      
Source 
  
Inflation inflation rate calculation 
is based on CPI 








proxy by civil war and 
political regime 







government expenditures on goods 
and services and national defense 
and security 







GDP divided by midyear population 
(GDP per capita in constant dollars 
2010) 









 net inflows  







ratio of trade with France and 
trade with the rest of the world 
    




































Figure 2: Placebo tests  
 
 



































































































































































Figure 3: Robustness tests: 
 




















































































































































































































































Chapter 3: Do Commodity Price Shocks Impact Central Bank Governors’ Removals? 
Evidence from Africa 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In macroeconomics, the twin-deficit hypothesis posits that there is a strong correlation 
between a nation’s current account deficit and its budget deficit. This economic phenomenon is 
more likely in African countries because they are heavily dependent on primary commodities 
such as crude oil or cocoa. In Africa, the ratio of primary commodities to exports has grown 
from 57% in 1990-1999 to 76% in 2010-2014 (Christensen, 2014).African countries with a lower 
degree of export diversification and a strong dependence on exports revenues; tend to run high 
fiscal deficits. When faced with low commodities prices, African countries have primarily 
financed these deficits using debt monetization. Other adverse effects of a commodity price 
shock can range from higher unemployment, decrease in government revenue to lower net 
exports.  
In a climate of low commodity prices, the monetary authority’s response to a current 
account deficit and a fiscal deficit should be centered on containing a rise in inflation and 
preventing an appreciation of the exchange rate. This is only possible however if the central bank 
is independent, that is the monetary authority is free to choose both the goals and the instruments 
of monetary policy. In most developing countries, specifically in Africa, the dominance of the 
fiscal authority can become a threat to the independence of central banks. For example, in 2014, 
the governor of the central bank of Nigeria was fired by the then Nigerian president when he 
uncovered the disappearance of billions of petrodollars from the government coffers. This 
scandal was exarcebated by the fact that Nigeria, the biggest producer of Brent crude petroleum 
in Africa, was trying to cope with the sudden decline in oil prices.  
Thus, this paper aims to examine the relationship between the probability of a central 
bank governor’s removal and commodity price shocks in an African context. To our knowledge, 
there is no paper in the literature on central bank independence (CBI) that has examined this 
particular relationship. Papers such as Dreher et al. (2010) have analyzed the determinants of 





being removed increased with political instability, the occurrence of elections or the share of 
legal term in office.  Other papers such as Artha and De Haan (2015) find that financial crises are 
also an important determinant of central bank governors’ removal. Using conditional fixed 
effects logit models that are similar to the models used in the papers aforementioned as well as 
Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we decompose central bank governors’ removals into premature 
removals, i.e. removals that occur before the end of the governor’s legal term in office and ally 
replacements, i.e. that is the central bank governor is replaced by an ally to the president. We 
then test the relationship between premature removals and commodity prices shocks as well as 
ally replacements and commodity price shocks. Our results could be summarized as follows: 
• Commodity price shocks do not have a statistically significant effect on premature 
removals. 
• Commodity price shocks lead to a statistically significant increase in the probability of an 
ally replacement. 
• This result holds when our full-sample is divided into two: CFA52 countries and non-CFA 
countries. 
• Oil/mineral shocks significantly increase the likelihood of an ally replacement. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into the following sections: Section 2 describes the data, 
section 3 explains the methodology, section 4 is the results, section 5 presents some robustness 
tests and section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data 
Our sample period is 1980-2009. We include 23 African countries, 9 CFA countries and 
14 non-CFA countries. We only include African countries whose economies have low level of 
export diversification53. The data on central bank governor changes is from various central bank 
websites as well as the KOF Swiss Economic Institute website. Among non-CFA countries, 
Mauritania experienced 14 central bank governor changes during our sample period; this is the 
highest number of changes. Whereas Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana had only 4 central bank 
                                                          
52 CFA countries are countries that are part of the CFA zone, a monetary union with France, in 
which the currency is pegged to the Euro at a fixed rate. 





governor changes which is the lowest. Among CFA countries, CEMAC54 countries only 
experience 2 central bank governor changes compared to 4 for the WAEMU55 countries over the 
entire period. In our sample, a central bank governor is replaced on average every 6 years and 1 
month. We classify our central bank governor changes as premature and ally according to 
Vuletin and Zhu (2011) and Strong (2019). Premature changes and ally changes are our 
dependent variables. 
Sample statistics are summarized in table 1.  
As mentioned above, our variable of interest is commodity price shocks56. Commodities 
include agricultural commodities such as cotton or cocoa beans and oil or minerals such as 
copper or gold. There are countries in our data set such as Nigeria where crude oil represents 
more than 70% of its exports or Burkina Faso where raw cotton represents more than 60% of its 
exports. The data on commodities prices is from Global Economic Monitor Commodities 
database (World Bank). Later on, we devise a robustness test that consists of classifying our data 
on commodities into two groups: agricultural and oil/minerals. 
Next, we include other determinants of the probability of a central bank governor changes. As 
previously done in the literature, we classify them as economic determinants and political 
determinants57. As shown in Table 1, our economic control variables consists of inflation, trade 
openness, income per capita and measures of financial development such as liquid liabilities or 
private credit. To control for the effect of outliers, we transform the inflation rate as follows: (𝜋 / 
(1+𝜋)) ∗ 100. 
Our political control variables include a democracy score, which is an eleven point scale 
(0-10) which is based on essential characteristics of a democracy such as the presence of 
institutions, the presence of constraints on the executive power or the guarantee of civil liberties. 
Regime score uses a (-10, 10) scale where -10 is autocratic and 10 is democracy. Coup d’état and 
civil war are dummy variables which takes a value of 1 if there is a civil war or coup d’état or 0 
otherwise. The data is from the Polity index from the Systemic Peace website. Finally 
presidential elections is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is an election that year 
and 0 otherwise. The data is from the African Elections Database. Finally monetary policy 
                                                          
54 CEMAC stands for the Central African Economic and Monetary Community. 
55 WAEMU stands for the West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
56 We simply take the natural log of commodity prices. 





arrangements include inflation targeting, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country in 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 













Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Variable of interest 
   
 
      
Commodity price 19.30 0.15 151.69  16.31 0.15 151.69 23.96 1.14 94.95 
Financial Factors 
   
 
      
Banking crisis 0.03 0.00 1.00  0.03 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Currency crisis 0.06 0.00 1.00  0.06 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Debt crisis 0.02 0.00 1.00  0.01 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Economic Factors 
   
 
      
Inflation 13.32 -17.75 200.03  17.69 -17.64 200.03 6.54 -17.75 80.79 
Trade openness 70.74 6.32 531.74  59.00 6.32 140.70 88.57 20.06 531.74 
Liquid Liabilities 25.28 0.00 98.47  29.54 0.00 98.47 17.79 0.42 31.40 
Private credit 15.82 0.00 82.86  17.58 0.00 82.86 12.67 0.89 41.19 
Government spending 14.55 2.06 84.51  14.29 2.06 45.30 14.95 2.65 84.51 
Income per capita 1777.71 202.43 20172.31  1226.90 202.43 7483.76 2618.21 289.12 20172.31 
Political Factors 
   
 
      
Presidential Elections 0.13 0.00 1.00  0.12 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Civil War 0.28 0.00 5.00  0.25 0.00 5.00 0.32 0.00 4.00 
Coup d’état 0.15 0.00 1.00  0.13 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Regime score -7.21 -10.00 10.00  -5.57 -10.00 10.00 -9.75 -10.00 7.00 
Democracy score 1.76 0.00 10.00  2.10 0.00 10.00 1.19 0.00 7.00 
Monetary policy arrangements 
   
 
      
Inflation Targeting 0.01 0.00 1.00  0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Factors 
   
 
      
Time spent in office 4.72 0.00 16.00  3.35 0.00 15.00 6.86 6.00 10.00 
Nature of central bank changes 
   
 
      
ally changes 0.04 0.00 1.00  0.05 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
premature changes 0.06 0.00 1.00  0.10 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 















We estimate the effect of commodity price shocks on the probability of a central bank 
governor replacement, where we define a replacement in two folds: 1) premature replacement 
that is a central bank governor is removed before the end of its term and 2) ally replacement that 
is a central bank governor’s replacement is an ally to the president that is nominating him. An 
ally has the following characteristics: 1. He or she occupies a high-ranking position (pertaining 
to the economy) in the executive branch such as minister of finance or minister of trade; 2. He or 
she occupies a high-ranking position in the political party in power. He or she shares tribal 
affiliation with the nominating president.  
Our dependent variable is governor changes that equal one if at least one change occurs or 0 
otherwise; this change is then classified as ally or premature58. Thus, we use the following 
conditional fixed effects logit model: 
changesit= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 shocksit-1 + 𝛽2 time-elapsedit-1 + 𝛽3 Xit-1 +𝛾i +𝜇it 
 
where changes are central bank governor changes; shocks are commodity price shocks; time-
elapsed is the number of years the central bank governor has already spent in office (Dreher et 
al., 2010, Klomp and De Haan, 2010 and De Haan and Artha, 2015). Xi is a vector of economic 
financial and political control variables; 𝛾i is each country’s fixed effect and 𝜇it is an i.i.d error 
term. Our model is estimated with clustered standard errors and control variables are lagged to 
avoid any possible endogeneity issues. 
Our financial variables include banking crisis, currency crisis and debt crisis. De Haan 
and Artha (2015) found that financial crises increase the probability of a central bank governor 
change; specifically banking and debt crises.  
Next, our economic control variables include the following: inflation, if a country suffers 
a period of high inflation; the central banker is often held responsible, which then will increase 
the probability of a central bank governor change. Trade openness, which is expected to lower 
the probability of a central governor since more open economies on average have a lower 
inflationary bias (Romer, 1993). Measures of financial development such as liquid liabilities, 
                                                          
58 In our data set, a change is either premature or non-premature such that total number of 
changes= PREMATURE+NON-PREMATURE. We repeat the same process for all changes, i.e. 




private credit and income per capita are expected to lower the probability of central bank 
governor exchange. The fiscal authority in countries with a high level of financial sector is less 
likely to rely on unanticipated monetary expansion in case of a deficit. (Sargent and Wallace, 
1981).  
Our political factors include presidential elections, which is likely to be positively related 
to a central bank governor change (De Haan and Artha, 2015). Similarly, measures of political 
instability such as coup d’état or civil war are expected to increase the probability of central bank 
governor change (Dreher et al., 2010). Finally, Political regimes, particularly democratic ones 
are likely to decrease the probability of a central bank governor change (Farvaque, 2002). 
Finally, monetary arrangements such as an explicit inflation target are a signal of a higher level 
of central bank independence; thus should be negatively related to the probability of a central 
bank governor change. 
 
3.4 Results 
We divide this section into two sections. The first section consists of looking at the effect 
of our variable of interest on the probability that a central bank governor gets removed 
prematurely. The second part looks at the effect of commodity shocks on the probability that a 
central bank governor gets replaced by an ally. 
 
a. Premature changes: 
We start by running a conditional fixed effects logit model where we include commodity 
price shocks as well as all of our other determinants of a central bank governor change59. Then, 
we rerun a model that includes only statistically significant variables that we add one by one to 
the model as shown in Table 2. 
Our variable of interest, commodity price shock, is statistically insignificant but becomes 
statistically significant when we include all the other determinants. As expected, there is a 
positive relationship between commodity price shock and premature removals. Other statistically 
significant variables include time in office, trade openness, civil war and democracy. Trade 
openness and democracy have the expected sign as shown in the previous papers 
aforementioned. But our results show that the probability of a premature removal decreases when  
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Table 2: Effect of commodity price shocks on premature removals of central bank governors (full sample). 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Commodity price shock 0.331 0.474 0.310 0.373 0.488 0.271 0.380 0.338 1.393** 
 
(0.564) (0.568) (0.569) (0.566) (0.549) (0.591) (0.573) (0.569) (0.670) 
Time in office 
 
-0.179*** 









     
2.028 
   
(1.141) 
     
(1.414) 
Inflation 
   
0.007 
    
0.003 
    
(0.007) 
    
(0.009) 
Trade openness 
    
-0.021* 
   
-0.034** 
     
(0.012) 
   
(0.015) 
Government spending 


















       
-0.037 0.204 
        
(0.482) (0.544) 
Banking crisis 
        
-0.461 
         
(1.313) 
Currency crisis 
        
-0.784 
         
(0.964) 
Democracy 
        
0.465* 
         
(0.261) 
Number of observations 449 449 449 449 449 433 449 449 396 
Prob. > Chi2 0.563 0.087 0.529 0.581 0.155 0.715 0.182 0.843 0.005 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor premature removal occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - 
***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the full sample (CFA and non-CFA countries). Prob. > chi2 represents the null 
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Table 3: The effect of commodity price shocks on premature removals of central bank governors (non-CFA countries).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Commodity price shock 0.344 0.475 0.310 0.397 0.531 0.268 0.405 0.309 0.570 
 
(0.599) (0.615) (0.606) (0.601) (0.580) (0.630) (0.611) (0.612) (0.639) 
Time in office 
 
-0.108 









     
1.735 
   
(1.191) 
     
(1.308) 
Inflation 
   
0.008 
    
0.004 
    
(0.008) 
    
(0.009) 
Trade openness 
    
-0.025** 
   
-0.026* 
     
(0.012) 
   
(0.014) 
Government spending 


















       
0.211 0.287 
        
(0.508) (0.573) 
Banking crisis 
        
-0.933 
         
(1.269) 
Currency crisis 
        
-0.129 
         
(0.863) 
Number of observations 329 329 329 329 329 318 329 329 318 
Prob. > Chi2 0.570 0.193 0.443 0.467 0.089 0.753 0.202 0.782 0.178 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor premature removal occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - 
***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the non-CFA countries. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all 






there is a civil war and the longer a central bank governor stays in office. This is contrary to the 
findings in the literature. One possible reason is that in African countries, where the degree of 
central bank independence is lower than in developed countries, fiscal authorities prefer to keep 
central bankers that have shown a certain degree of cooperation.  
Next, we check for the heterogeneity in our data, by dividing our full sample into two 
regions: CFA countries and non-CFA countries; then, we rerun our analysis, but only for non-
CFA countries. Results are shown in Table 3. None of the coefficients on commodity shocks are 
statistically significant. The only variable that is statistically significant is trade openness and as 
expected, the sign is negative. 
  
b. Ally changes: 
In this section, the dependent variable is now the probability that a central bank governor 
change is an ally change. We start first with an analysis of the full sample and our results are 
shown in Table 4 below. Our results reveal that commodity price shocks lead to a statistically 
significant increase of the probability of an ally replacement by 161.4 percentage points when 
our variable of interest is included by itself. When we include all other explanatory variables, 
this probability increases by 203.3 percentage points. Other statistically significant variables 
include time in office, which increases the probability of an ally change occurring by 8.6 
percentage points or civil war which leads to a statistically significant decrease in the probability 
of a central bank governor ally change. These results are consistent with our findings above. 
Next, to control for heterogeneity, we split our full sample into two: non-CFA countries 
and CFA countries. In this section, we are able to include the latter group because our data on 
ally changes has enough variation. Results are shown in Table 5 below. A commodity price 
shock leads to a statistically significant increase of the probability of a central bank governor ally 
replacement. Civil war and political regime have a statistically significant effect on the 









Table 4: The effect of commodity price shocks on central bank governors’ ally replacement (full 
sample).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Commodity price shock 1.614** 1.619** 1.699*** 1.721*** 1.647** 1.631** 2.033*** 
 
(0.641) (0.659) (0.657) (0.658) (0.667) (0.657) (0.748) 
Time in office 
 
0.046 









   
0.011 
   
(0.011) 
   
(0.011) 
Trade openness 


















     
-0.001 -0.009 
      
(0.010) (0.011) 
Number of observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Prob. > Chi2 0.014 0.032 0.041 0.038 0.003 0.050 0.013 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally 
replacement occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. 
Results are for the full sample. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all coefficients are equal to zero. 
 
 
Table 5: The effect of commodity price shocks on central bank governors’ ally replacement (non-
CFA countries).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Commodity price shock 1.419*** 1.419*** 1.462*** 1.512*** 1.494*** 1.423*** 1.590*** 
 
(0.511) (0.507) (0.552) (0.531) (0.513) (0.491) (0.575) 
Time in office 
 
-0.010 









   
0.005 
   
(0.007) 
   
(0.008) 
Trade openness 


















     
-0.010* -0.014** 
      
(0.006) (0.006) 
Number of observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Prob. > Chi2 0.006 0.014 0.027 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally replacement 
occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the non-CFA 







Next, we look at the effect of commodity price shocks in the CFA zone; results are 
shown below in Table 6. Commodity price shocks lead to a statistically significant increase in 
the probability of a central bank governor ally replacement in CFA countries. When this variable 
is included by itself, this probability increases by 196.5 percentage points and 237.8 percentage 
points when all other explanatory variables. None of the other determinants of our dependent 
variable are statistically significant. 
 
Table 6: The effect of commodity price shocks on central bank governors’ ally replacement (CFA 
countries)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Commodity price shock 1.956** 2.213*** 1.878** 1.980** 1.885** 2.128** 2.378** 
 
(0.776) (0.854) (0.769) (0.776) (0.803) (0.830) (0.954) 
Time in office 
 
0.096 









   
-0.023 
   
(0.046) 
   
(0.050) 
Trade openness 


















     
-0.011 -0.018 
      
(0.016) (0.017) 
Number of observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
Prob. > Chi2 0.016 0.019 0.039 0.051 0.052 0.045 0.049 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally 
replacement occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. 
Results are for the CFA countries. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all coefficients are equal to zero. 
 
3.5 Robustness Test 
We have been analyzing the effect of commodity price shocks on the probability that a 
central bank governor is removed prematurely or that the central bank governor is replaced by an 
ally. As a robustness test, we divide our group of commodities into two: agricultural 
commodities and oil/mineral commodities and re-run our analysis. For agricultural commodities, 
our data set now consists of 12 countries: 8 non-CFA countries and 4 CFA countries and the 
main agricultural commodities are cocoa beans, coffee and cotton. For oil/mineral commodities, 





are crude petroleum (oil), except for the Democratic Republic of Congo which exports 
copper and Mauritania which exports iron ore. 
 
a. Premature removals: 
In Table A1 and A2, shown in the appendix, we examine the effect of agricultural 
commodities shocks to the probability of a premature removal. In the full sample, the 
coefficients on our dependent variable are all statistically insignificant. Also, time in office and 
democracy both remain statistically significant and the coefficients have the same sign. Next, we 
split the full sample into non-CFA and CFA countries, but as before we have no variation in the 
data for CFA countries, so we only perform an analysis for non-CFA countries. The coefficients 
on shocks remain statistically insignificant. Trade openness now becomes statistically 
insignificant whereas Time in office and debt are now statistically significant. The level of a 
country’s debt leads to an increase in the probability of a premature removal by 240 percentage 
points. 
Next, we look at the effects of oil/mineral commodities shocks on premature removals. 
The results are shown in Tables A3 and A4. In the full sample, the coefficient on shock is 
positive and statistically significant. An oil/mineral shock leads to an increase of 320 percentage 
points in the probability of a central bank governor being prematurely removed. For non-CFA 
countries, the coefficient on shocks is only significant when trade openness, the only statistically 
significant explanatory variable, is included. 
 
b. Ally replacements: 
Tables A5, A6 and A7 present the results for agricultural commodities. For the full 
sample, the coefficients on shocks are now statistically insignificant. But, for non-CFA countries 
and CFA countries, the relationship between shocks and the probability of an ally replacement 
remain positive and statistically significant. Finally, for oil/mineral commodities, that 
relationship is positive and statistically significant for the full sample and CFA countries only. 









This paper analyzes the effect of commodity price shocks on the probability of a central 
bank governor’s removal. Using a conditional fixed effects logit model with robust standard 
errors model similar to Dreher et al. (2010) or Artha and De Haan (2015), we examine the effect 
of these shocks on premature removals and ally replacements.  Our results show that commodity 
price shocks lead to a substantial statistically significant increase of the probability of an ally 
replacement both in non-CFA countries as well as CFA countries. When commodity price 
shocks are decomposed into agricultural commodities shocks and oil/mineral shocks show that 
agricultural commodities shock do not have an effect both on premature removals and ally 
replacements. Whereas, oil/mineral shocks significantly increase the likelihood that a central 
banker is prematurely removed or gets replaced by an ally. Our analysis shows that African 
countries with a high degree of export concentration and oil/minerals as their primary 
commodities have a higher likelihood of central bank governor premature removals as well as a 
higher likelihood of ally replacements. This is true for African countries with national central 
banks and their own currencies as well as countries that are part of a monetary union. This is 
especially relevant for CFA countries, because of the de facto nomination process of a central 





















A. Premature removals of central bank governors 
 
Table A1: The effect of agricultural commodity price shocks on premature removals of central 
bank governors (full sample).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Agricultural price shocks -0.682 -0.242 -0.964 -1.024 -0.494 -0.479 -1.468 -0.427 -3.284 
 
(1.771) (1.972) (1.798) (1.838) (1.837) (1.804) (1.929) (1.798) (3.630) 
Time in office 
 
-0.965*** 









     
6.940 
   
(1.215) 
     
(9.503) 
Inflation 
   
0.011 
    
-0.048 
    
(0.011) 
    
(0.053) 
Trade openness 
    
0.032 
   
0.044 
     
(0.026) 
   
(0.032) 
Government spending 


















       
-15.572 -13.702 
        
(2.117) (2.870) 
Banking crisis 
        
-15.154 
         
(2.740) 
Currency crisis 
        
1.977 
         
(1.910) 
Regime 
        
-0.921** 
         
(0.419) 
Democracy 
        
2.000** 
         
(0.910) 
Number of observations 270 270 270 270 270 265 270 270 232 
Prob. > chi 0.698 0.000 0.391 0.625 0.450 0.825 0.294 0.285 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor 
premature removal occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table A2: The effect of agricultural commodity price shocks on premature removals of central bank governors (non-CFA countries). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Agricultural price shocks -0.466 -0.322 -0.958 -0.759 -0.307 -0.256 -2.111 -0.215 -2.589 
 
(1.897) (2.074) (2.011) (1.967) (1.944) (1.961) (2.302) (1.911) (3.045) 
Time in office 
 
-1.241*** 









     
9.891 
   
(1.340) 
     
(8.594) 
Inflation 
   
0.009 
    
-0.092 
    
(0.012) 
    
(0.059) 
Trade openness 
    
0.017 
   
0.018 
     
(0.029) 
   
(0.028) 
Government spending 


















       
-14.760 -14.591 
        
(1.902) (3.318) 
Banking crisis 
        
-14.540 
         
(5.345) 
Currency crisis 
        
2.304 
         
(1.782) 
Number of observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Prob. > chi 0.805 0.000 0.286 0.773 0.811 0.815 0.126 0.504 0.011 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally replacement occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; 
.05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the full sample. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all coefficients are 
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Table A3: Effect of oil/mineral commodity price shocks on premature removals of central bank governors (full sample). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Oil/Mineral price shocks 0.905 1.198 0.806 1.212 2.470** 0.773 1.003 0.921 3.209** 
 
(0.892) (0.983) (0.892) (0.988) (1.229) (0.923) (0.940) (0.907) (1.507) 
Time in office 
 
-0.122 









     
16.348 
   
(2.306) 
     
(1.081) 
Inflation 
   
0.012 
    
0.011 
    
(0.010) 
    
(0.013) 
Trade openness 
    
-0.044*** 
   
-0.050** 
     
(0.017) 
   
(0.020) 
Government spending 


















       
-0.056 0.024 
        
(0.552) (0.671) 
Banking crisis 
        
0.400 
         
(1.368) 
Currency crisis 
        
-1.659 
         
(1.367) 
Regime 
        
-0.065 
         
(0.055) 
Democracy 
        
0.277 
         
(0.180) 
Number of observations 180 180 180 180 180 169 180 180 166 
Prob. > chi 0.278 0.155 0.063 0.277 0.008 0.522 0.153 0.552 0.014 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor premature removal occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - 
***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the full sample. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all coefficients 
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Table A4: Effect of oil/mineral commodity price shocks on premature removals of central bank governors (non-CFA countries). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Oil/Mineral price shocks 0.643 0.817 0.540 0.948 2.127* 0.491 0.717 0.613 2.231 
 
(0.869) (0.948) (0.864) (0.972) (1.257) (0.899) (0.915) (0.881) (1.474) 
Time in office 
 
-0.085 









     
15.193 
   
(8.370) 
     
(6.794) 
Inflation 
   
0.014 
    
0.012 
    
(0.010) 
    
(0.012) 
Trade openness 
    
-0.042** 
   
-0.044** 
     
(0.017) 
   
(0.019) 
Government spending 


















       
0.109 0.039 
        
(0.564) (0.683) 
Banking crisis 
        
-0.207 
         
(1.349) 
Currency crisis 
        
-0.895 
         
(1.204) 
Number of observations 150 150 150 150 150 139 150 150 139 
Prob. > chi 0.436 0.416 0.081 0.309 0.014 0.602 0.210 0.725 0.058 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor premature removal occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - 
***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the non-CFA countries. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all 









B. Ally replacements of central bank governors: 
 
Table A5: The effect of agricultural commodity price shocks on central bank governors’ ally 
replacement (full sample).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Agricultural price shocks 2.078 1.821 2.071 1.665 1.863 2.422 -1.540 
 
(1.686) (2.340) (1.685) (1.827) (1.705) (1.755) (3.292) 
Time in office 
 
-0.906* 









   
-0.039 
   
(0.050) 
   
(0.051) 
Trade openness 


















     
-0.017 -0.003 
      
(0.019) (0.026) 
Number of observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Prob. > chi 0.131 0.001 0.295 0.243 0.288 0.217 0.008 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally 
replacement occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. 
Results are for the full sample. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all coefficients are equal to zero. 
 
 
Table A6: The effect of agricultural commodity price shocks on central bank governors’ ally 
replacement (non-CFA countries).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Agricultural price shock 3.246*** 3.987*** 3.399*** 4.479*** 3.498*** 3.645*** 3.229*** 
 





   
-
0.060***    
(0.012) 
   
(0.022) 
Trade openness 









     
0.025** 0.017 
      
(0.013) (0.011) 
Number of observations 240 43 240 230 234 240 40 
Prob. > chi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally 
replacement occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. 










Table A7: The effect of agricultural commodity price shocks on central bank governors’ ally 
replacement (CFA countries)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Agricultural price shock 1.228*** 0.954*** 1.225*** 0.809* 1.468*** 1.324*** 0.287 
 
(0.320) (0.199) (0.356) (0.441) (0.256) (0.468) (1.611) 
Time in office 
 
-0.773*** 









   
0.095 
   
(0.086) 
   
(0.161) 
Trade openness 


















     
-0.011 0.014 
      
(0.016) (0.033) 
Number of observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Prob. > chi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.093 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally replacement 
occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the CFA 
countries. Prob. > chi2 represents the null hypothesis of all coefficients are equal to zero. 
 
Table A8: Effect of oil/mineral commodity price shocks on ally replacements of central bank 
governors (full sample).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Oil/Mineral price shocks 2.311** 2.022** 2.666** 2.622** 2.665** 2.255** 3.217*** 
 
(0.998) (1.028) (1.061) (1.064) (1.070) (1.014) (1.238) 
Time in office 
 
0.093 









   
0.020* 
   
(0.011) 
   
(0.012) 
Trade openness 


















     
0.003 -0.005 
      
(0.012) (0.014) 
Number of observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 
Prob. > chi 0.017 0.015 0.031 0.030 0.002 0.055 0.002 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally replacement 
occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. Results are for the full sample. 









Table A9: Effect of oil/mineral commodity price shocks on ally replacements of central bank 
governors (non-CFA countries).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Oil/Mineral price shocks 0.887 0.843 1.233 1.081 1.130 0.836 1.512 
 
(1.083) (1.101) (1.182) (1.256) (1.178) (1.081) (1.427) 
Time in office 
 
0.015 









   
0.015 
   
(0.011) 
   
(0.012) 
Trade openness 


















     
0.004 -0.005 
      
(0.012) (0.014) 
Number of observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Prob. > chi 0.392 0.682 0.423 0.654 0.042 0.661 0.184 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally 
replacement occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. 




Table A10: Effect of oil/mineral commodity price shocks on ally replacements of central bank 
governors (CFA countries).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Oil/Mineral price shocks 10.030*** 18.685** 11.879** 9.867*** 9.959*** 8.789*** 18.241* 
 
(3.705) (9.178) (4.748) (3.789) (3.676) (3.392) (10.577) 
Time in office 
 
0.237** 









   
-0.038 
   
(0.160) 
   
(0.260) 
Trade openness 


















     
0.302 0.644 
      
(0.292) (1.604) 
Number of observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Prob. > chi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one central bank governor ally 
replacement occurs and 0, otherwise; .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; the number in parentheses are standard errors. 
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